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WHO’S AFRAID OF
PHILANTHROCAPITALISM?
Garry W. Jenkins†
This Article explores the concept of philanthrocapitalism—an
emerging model for charitable giving intended to enhance the
practice of philanthropy through the application of certain business
techniques, particularly envisioned as being deftly carried out by a
subset of ultra-rich, experienced business people. During the past
fifteen years, but most strikingly in the past five, private foundations
influenced by philanthrocapitalism and its forbearers have become
increasingly directive, controlling, metric focused, and business
oriented with respect to their interactions with grantee public
charities in an attempt to demonstrate that the work of the
foundations is “strategic” and “accountable.” Combining empirical
analysis and theoretical critique, this Article challenges the
prevailing wisdom that philanthrocapitalism offers a better, smarter
philanthropy, thereby strengthening the entire nonprofit sector. In
fact, after observing and documenting the tenets of and rhetoric
associated with philanthrocapitalism, there is a serious risk that the
shift to business-like, market-driven giving may change the nature of
philanthropy in ways we will come to regret. Moreover, this Article
links concerns about philanthrocapitalism to a broader disquiet about
the blurring lines between the public and the private. I argue that
nonprofit scholars and advocates should pay greater attention to this
movement and what its “success” might mean for the social sector.

† Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Associate Professor of Law, The Ohio State
University Moritz College of Law. For helpful comments and suggestions, I thank Martha
Chamallas, Amy Cohen, Deborah Merritt, Marc Spindelman, Donald Tobin, and the members
of the Nonprofit Forum. Also thanks to Andrew Isaacs and Sarah Rives Horn for their research
assistance. Finally, a special thanks to Dean Alan Michaels for his support. The title is used with
apologies to playwright Edward Albee and his classic Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf?, a work
about false illusion, whose title itself is a play on the Walt Disney song “Who’s Afraid of the
Big Bad Wolf?”
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INTRODUCTION
Powerful grantmaking institutions profoundly influence much of
civic life, in both the United States and abroad. Decisions made by
foundation board members and staffs greatly affect millions of
nonprofit organizations and the people they serve. Today the
relationship between private foundations (philanthropic grantmaking
entities) and public charities (grant-receiving nonprofit enterprises)1 is
1 There are two types of organizations that qualify for recognition of federal income tax
exemption under § 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code: private foundations and non-private
foundations. See I.R.C. § 509 (2006). Entities primarily engaged in grantmaking and relying on
their own principal fund, usually an endowment, are private foundations. Generally, 501(c)(3)
organizations that are not private foundations have been colloquially referred to as “public
charities” by lawyers. Most private foundations make grants to public charities, which tend to
receive substantial support from the government, general public, and private foundations. These
donor-reliant organizations often provide direct services or advocacy to fulfill their charitable
mission. The term public charity, however, encompasses a broad set of modern nonprofit
entities, including advocacy and civic organizations, arts and cultural organizations, colleges
and universities, hospitals, religious organizations, among others. Therefore, this Article uses
the term “public charities” or “charities” to refer to all organizations that are not private
foundations under § 509(a). For more detail on the distinction between private foundations and
public charities, see Carter G. Bishop, The Deontological Significance of Nonprofit Corporate
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very much in flux. In particular, philanthrocapitalism—the
application of business techniques to philanthropy by a new
generation of self-made, hands-on donors—and strategic
grantmaking, as new models of giving, have burst onto the scene,
commandeering attention and potentially reshaping philanthropy.2 For
the past decade, there have been growing calls for the nonprofit sector
to consider new innovative approaches in conducting its work—
borrowed principally from the private sector—in order to improve
capacity, efficiency, accountability, and effectiveness.3 At first these
calls were primarily focused on the work of public charities. Lately,
however, private foundations have become the target of those seeking
to harness the power of “market-based” innovation, as a sort of new
technology, to contribute to the project of smarter philanthropy.
Further evidencing the concept’s prominence, a recent article
included philanthrocapitalism among the ten most important
philanthropy buzzwords and phrases of the past decade.4
Led by billionaires and multimillionaires—armed with their keen
business skills—philanthrocapitalism seeks to improve the practice of
philanthropy through the application of techniques common to forprofit businesses. Driven by a desire to bring hard-nosed strategy,
performance metrics, and an emphasis on effectiveness to the
nonprofit sector, a new guard of influential donors is changing the
standards for what is considered effective philanthropy. Private
foundations, grant-receiving public charities, nonprofit boards, and

Governance Standards: A Fiduciary Duty of Care Without a Remedy, 57 CATH. U. L. REV. 701,
759–61 (2008).
2 See, e.g., James Edward Harris, Level Five Philanthropy: Designing a Plan for
Strategic, Effective, Efficient Giving, U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 19 (2003) (discussing the
potential impact of strategic philanthropic giving); Dana Brakman Reiser, For-Profit
Philanthropy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2472 (2009) (noting the advent of
philanthrocapitalism); The Birth of Philanthrocapitalism, ECONOMIST, Feb. 25, 2006, at 8
(noting how the leading new philanthropists see themselves as social investors, and how the
philanthropic infrastructure increasingly will resemble capitalism); Kristine Henry, An Expert
on Philanthropy Takes Think-Tank Job, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, June 12, 2008, at 57 (quoting
Jane Wales, vice president for philanthropy and society of the Aspen Institute, who stated that
“[t]he question of applying private-sector metrics to social-change goals, what some people call
‘philanthrocapitalism,’ is an area of a good deal of debate with the philanthropic community
right now”); Christopher Quinn, Buy Coffee, Help a Village, ATLANTA J.-CONST., May 23,
2009, at D1 (noting that philanthrocapitalism is “a concept that is getting a lot of attention in the
world of nonprofits”).
3 See, e.g., Bill Bradley et al., The Nonprofit Sector’s $100 Billion Opportunity, HARV.
BUS. REV., May 2003, at 94.
4 See Lucy Bernholz, Editorial, ‘Impact Economy’: A Look Ahead and Back at a Decade
of Nonprofit Buzzwords, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Jan. 13, 2011, at 44 (ranking
“philanthrocapitalism” as the number-six buzzword).
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the professionals who counsel and advise grantors and grantees are
feeling the impact.
The most prominent chroniclers of this movement are Matthew
Bishop, the New York bureau chief of the Economist, and Michael
Green, an economist. Their book, Philanthrocapitalism: How the
Rich Can Save the World, is a rosy meditation on the future of
American philanthropy that combines analysis, profiles, and
anecdotes to reveal a new wave of charitable grantmaking with a new
vocabulary and renewed strength.5 Bishop and Green applaud “[t]he
new philanthropists” whom they believe are greatly improving a
system they see as ineffective and in desperate need of reshaping.6 In
their assessment, “The past couple of decades have been a golden age
for capitalism, and today’s new philanthropists are trying to apply the
secrets behind that money-making success to their giving.”7
The appeal of philanthrocapitalism is easy to grasp. It is tempting
to imagine society’s most pressing social ills being solved by a new
breed of entrepreneurs-turned-philanthropists, who revolutionize
grantmaking through the application of their business acumen,
ambition, and “strategic” mindset. Traditionally, philanthropy has
been cast as a welcome partner of government in addressing public
needs.8 But, following the rise of neoliberalism as a dominant cultural
and political ideology9 and the significant private wealth creation of
the past twenty years,10 the social sector has looked to markets and
business as sources of inspiration to improve the work of public
charities.11 Thus we have a new wave of thought in philanthropy
looking to imbue capitalist/business principles and market-based
5 MATTHEW BISHOP & MICHAEL GREEN, PHILANTHROCAPITALISM: HOW THE RICH CAN
SAVE THE WORLD (2008).
6 Id. at 2.
7 Id. at 2–3.
8 See PETER FRUMKIN, STRATEGIC GIVING: THE ART AND SCIENCE OF PHILANTHROPY
30 (2006) (“One explanation for the tax code’s inclination to support giving is that government
sees private philanthropy as a necessary partner in the pursuit of public purposes.”); Shelly
Banjo, Is It Public, or Is It Private?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 9, 2009, at R5 (discussing increase in
partnerships between government and philanthropic organizations).
9 See DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2005); THE RISE OF
NEOLIBERALISM AND INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS (John L. Campbell & Ove K. Pederson eds.,
2001); Scott Burris et al., Changes in Governance: A Cross-Disciplinary Review of Current
Scholarship, 41 AKRON L. REV. 1, 46 (2008).
10 See Todd J. Zywicki, An Economic Analysis of the Consumer Bankruptcy Crisis, 99
NW. U. L. REV. 1463, 1484 (2005) (“During the past fifty years, Americans have benefited from
a dramatic increase in household net wealth. Moreover, this increase in wealth has accelerated
dramatically during the past twenty years . . . .”); Jim Krane, More People Making Their First
Million/Strong Global Economy Adds to Wealthy Rolls, HOUSTON CHRON., June 21, 2006, at 3
(noting the rapid growth in the number of millionaires worldwide).
11 See, e.g., J. Gregory Dees, Enterprising Nonprofits, HARV. BUS. REV., Jan.–Feb. 1998,
at 54, 56.
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theory into the work of not-for-profit, private foundations. Moreover,
this past decade has seen academics and policymakers embrace “third
way” solutions that blend public and private regulatory modalities.12
In light of these converging trends, it is no surprise to find people
enticed by an idea that promises to “save the world” through business
thinking and market methods.
The movement started with a small group of initial practitioners—
successful-entrepreneurs-turned-philanthropists—and expanded to
include hundreds of foundations and advisory firms that have become
its most forceful advocates.13 The principles of philanthrocapitalism
have now captured the attention of journalists, foundation
professionals, and trustees at “mainstream” foundations,
governments, and beyond. Philanthropic institutions and even
ordinary individuals are watching, mimicking this new development,
and rapidly absorbing its messages all too well.14 This Article
critiques the discourse of philanthrocapitalism and suggests that the
rhetoric behind it has consequences.
This Article proceeds from the premise that this emerging
conception of what it means to practice “effective” philanthropy
warrants examination because it has implications for how we think
about the accountability and stewardship of tax-privileged resources
managed by private individuals for the public benefit. Certainly, the
additional philanthropic resources contributed by successful business
12 See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY: THE RENEWAL OF SOCIAL DEMOCRACY
(1998); MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE PUBLIC GOOD
(2002); Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 547–49
(2000); Michele Estrin Gilman, Poverty and Communitarianism: Toward A Community-Based
Welfare System, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 721, 741 (2005) (noting President Clinton’s penchant for
“Third Way” problem solving); Kathleen D. Hall, Science, Globalization, and Educational
Governance: The Political Rationalities of the New Managerialism, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL
STUD. 153, 158–64 (2005) (describing the emergence of Third Way problem solving in the
United States and Great Britain through the 1990s and 2000s); Lili Levi, The Four Eras of FCC
Public Interest Regulation, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 813, 854 n.157 (2008) (noting the profusion of
“third way” literature during the last decade); Cass R. Sunstein, A New Progressivism, 17 STAN.
L. & POL’Y REV. 197, 199–201 (2006) (discussing the “New Progressivism” and is relationship
with the “Third Way”).
13 See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 220–77, 232–35.
14 See infra text accompanying notes 63–67 (discussing philanthropic institutional
responses); see also Kristi Heim, Got Cash to Spare? Starting Soon, Gates Foundation Will
Accept It, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 1, 2006, at B1 (describing a seven-year-old girl inspired by
Warren Buffett’s gift to the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation who donated $35 of her own to
the Foundation causing the Gates Foundation to adopt a new policy on accepting gifts); BILL &
MELINDA GATES FOUND., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT: PROGRESS AND PRESSING NEEDS 21–22
(2009) [hereinafter BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT] (reporting that the
Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation received more than $10 million in unsolicited donations from
the general public, other than Gates and Buffett, in 2008 which was up from $1.6 million in
2007); BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., ANNUAL REPORT 2007, at 44–45 (2008) (reporting
that several members of the general public made contributions).
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entrepreneurs and investors are greatly needed and welcomed by
recipients. But a giving model that exclusively subscribes to the
notion that this particular subgroup, through their use of business
methods, is always engaged in better, smarter, and more effective
grantmaking has dangerous appeal. This Article identifies and focuses
on the dangers.
Because charitable giving is generally presumed to be beneficial,
regardless of its form, philanthropy is often taken for granted and
rarely subjected to intense scrutiny. Many people have the normative
impulse to assume that as long as charitable activity is undertaken in a
manner consistent with law, it must therefore advance the greater
good. In addition, recipients are often so grateful for the funding that
they may overlook other concerns. Furthermore, a common line of
thinking that starts with a recognition that giving is an optional act
(e.g., “it’s their money”), an understanding that resources could be
used for private consumption rather than public benefit (e.g., “they
don’t have to donate it”), and an appreciation for the expressive value
of giving to shape solutions and society (e.g., “so they should be able
to do what they want”) leads people to be hesitant to criticize or
question the philanthropic system. But even within the domain of
what is legal, there are many activities that we might rightfully be
concerned about because of their influence on society and
infringement on other important values. My concern with the new
form of philanthropy is not about its end uses—i.e., where the
charitable donation goes—but rather the new ways that
philanthrocapitalism governs and constrains how the funding flows.
While I strongly support the independence and limited role of the
state to dictate matters of charity governance, 15 the self-governance
exercised by foundations should be subject to critical evaluation and
reflection. Although I would not legally regulate these new forms of
philanthropic giving, I would encourage robust conversation about
best practices in light of what I see as its harmful effects.
Its proponents have billed this new form of philanthropy as one
that is more ambitious, more strategic, more global, and more results
oriented, requiring higher levels of personal involvement by donors
than more traditional approaches.16 Less often discussed in the
literature, however, is the fact that although donors have always had a
certain degree of disproportionate control in grantor-grantee
15 For an excellent discussion of foundation independence, see Evelyn Brody & John
Tyler, Respecting Foundation and Charity Autonomy: How Public Is Private Philanthropy?, 85
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 579–583 (2010).
16 John A. Byrne, The New Face of Philanthropy, BUS. WK., Dec. 2, 2002, at 82, 83–84.
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relationships, this new movement, with its use of cutting-edge
language about strategy and effectiveness, exacerbates the divide and
strains these relationships further. As a result, grantmakers influenced
by this movement are becoming more paternalistic, leaning toward
foundation-centered problem-solving models that disempower
grantees and the communities they serve. And more and more
grantmakers are remaking themselves in this troubling new image.
As I see it, philanthrocapitalism is the Martha Stewart of
philanthropy: haughty and self-important, but simultaneously
charming with mass appeal. To be fair, the problem lies less with the
idea’s overarching goals than with its specific claims. It is important
to appreciate the broader context in which the debate over
philanthrocapitalism takes place, one in which public and private
boundaries, market and communitarian values, and new global
governance structures are being renegotiated and reevaluated.
Although philanthrocapitalists may raise important questions about
grantmaking, there are significant drawbacks to embracing
philanthrocapitalism as a new paragon for carrying out charitable
giving. Many of the practices associated with the attitude and style of
this new form of giving endanger some of the most essential benefits
and values the nonprofit sector brings to society, namely the role of
nonprofit institutions in social change, the promotion of democratic
values, and the building of communities and social ties through
empowerment and participation. The goal of this Article is to
encourage readers to critically examine the philanthrocapitalism
movement to determine whether its core principles are deserving of
broad application. Toward that end, this Article breaks new ground in
presenting significant empirical research and offering a critical
perspective of a seemingly positive trend.
With philanthropy on the brink of an evolutionary shift, the
question of what type of giving model will predominate the more than
$580 billion in foundation assets17 is especially important to the
nonprofit sector. Nothing less than the heart and soul of philanthropy
is at stake. It is essential for lawyers to understand this major dialogue
in the charitable sector. Private foundations and public charities rely
on attorneys for advice on a range of issues, and lawyers are well
represented on nonprofit boards.18 Therefore, it is not enough for
nonprofit lawyers to be just skilled technicians capable of crafting
17 See STEVEN LAWRENCE & REINA MUKAI, FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GROWTH AND
GIVING ESTIMATES: CURRENT OUTLOOK 2 (2010) [hereinafter FOUNDATION GROWTH AND
GIVING 2010].
18 See RICHARD P. CHAIT ET AL., GOVERNANCE AS LEADERSHIP: REFRAMING THE WORK
OF NONPROFIT BOARDS 4 (2005).
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grant agreements; they also need to understand this major shift in the
way funders and grantees interact. Just like their for-profit
counterparts, nonprofit clients need and want their lawyers to
understand relevant industry trends and developments in order to
provide high quality service and sophisticated advice.19 Lawyers must
have a deeper understanding of these trends, the pressures, and
cultural dynamics facing the organizations, and the potential costs and
benefits to the nonprofit sector (the relevant “industry” in this case) as
a whole. This is the case whether lawyers are representing
grantmaking foundations or grant-receiving charities, in order to
provide counsel with a practical wisdom and a sense of judgment
(which often requires balancing what is legal with what is right).
This Article traces the genealogy of the philanthrocapitalism
project, analyzes data to contextualize the rapid growth of this
movement and its ideals, and describes why its rise should be
worrisome. Part I explains philanthrocapitalism and strategic
philanthropy with a focus on the language and the key principles of
the movement. This Part explores the new philanthropy and compares
it to more traditional grantmaking practices. Part II undertakes
important descriptive work, detailing and documenting the broad
effect of this new philanthropic movement. It presents original
empirical research to illustrate the ways in which some of the
principles advanced by philanthrocapitalism are slowly being
embraced by foundation boards and professionals and impacting the
practice of philanthropy on the ground. Part III provides a normative
argument that identifies the dangers of philanthrocapitalism. The
discussion invokes important principles of effectiveness in social
change, core democratic and charitable values, and civic participation
at stake for the nonprofit sector. In addition, I explore how, ironically,
philanthrocapitalism purports to extol the values and virtues of freemarket ideals, but instead may distort the behavior of private
foundations in ways that lead them to employ a command-and-control
approach to their work that is inconsistent with commonly held freemarket principles. In this sense, the movement may be in tension with
its own ends.

19 See David E. Van Zandt, Foundational Competencies: Innovation in Legal Education,
61 RUTGERS L. REV. 1127, 1134 (2009) (“[T]he most successful lawyers—in firms and
beyond—need to understand not only their clients’ legal challenges, but also the business,
organizational, and strategic contexts in which they arise.”); David B. Wilkins, Team of Rivals?
Toward a New Model of the Corporate Attorney-Client Relationship, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.
2067, 2088 (2010) (noting that research indicates that clients place “a high premium on finding
lawyers who ‘understand their business’”).
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To be clear, charitable giving should be admired and encouraged.
This Article does not aim to criticize the creation of grantmaking
foundations or to impugn the munificence of wealthy corporate
executives and business investors, such as Bill Gates, Warren Buffett,
and others mentioned herein. To the contrary, I praise the generosity
of spirit displayed by all donors willing to share substantial private
resources for the public good or to help those in need. Rather, the
Article asserts that an idealized model of effectiveness, focused
predominantly on applying the business techniques of self-made
billionaires in order to determine where and how funds are allocated,
is an impoverished model. In doing so, this Article hopes to
contribute to a broader conversation about the role and mission of
philanthropy and to place the discussion in a broader academic
conversation about private ordering and social policy.
I. UNDERSTANDING PHILANTHROCAPITALISM AND
STRATEGIC GRANTMAKING
Philanthrocapitalism has developed as a subcategory of social
enterprise work, the term used to describe efforts to combine social
goals with commercial business methods.20 Discussions of social
enterprise have traditionally focused on the work of public charities
and for-profit entities. Over the past decade, the concept of social
enterprise or social entrepreneurship has aroused significant interest
and attention in the charitable sector and in the scholarly literature.21
Both social enterprise and social entrepreneurship, however, are
diffuse concepts that have been used and defined in a myriad of ways.
Social entrepreneurship is most often used in connection with public
charities. It focuses either on the formation by public-minded “change
agents” of a new organization or project with a compelling social
mission or on the promotion by nonprofit organizations of innovative
programs and initiatives intended to generate earned income through
commercial revenue, user fees, etc.22 Social enterprise, usually used
20 See James J. Fishman, Wrong Way Corrigan and Recent Developments in the Nonprofit
Landscape: A Need for New Legal Approaches, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 567, 599–601 (2007);
Reiser, supra note 2, at 2449–51.
21 See, e.g., Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The Convenient Truth of
How the Business Judgment Rule Protects a Board’s Decision to Engage in Social
Entrepreneurship, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 633 (2007) (“Social entrepreneurship is
significantly impacting traditional philanthropy as there is a growing push for charities to
become more business-like in how they are operated.”).
22 See Thomas Kelley, Rediscovering Vulgar Charity: A Historical Analysis of America’s
Tangled Nonprofit Law, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2463–64 (2005) (providing examples of
entrepreneurial charities); David E. Pozen, We Are All Entrepreneurs Now, 43 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 283, 294–300 (2008) (describing different definitions and uses of the term “social
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in connection with for-profit corporations, focuses on ventures
seeking “a double bottom line,” that is, the pursuit of both social
impact and financial reward through the delivery of services or
products.23 Interestingly, philanthrocapitalism has evolved from an
effort to apply these same principles to the work of private
foundations. The first-wave effort to apply a combination of business
and social practices to philanthropy led to the advent of “venture
philanthropy,” generally considered a form of engaged grantmaking
loosely based on the practices of venture-capital investing.24 Professor
Thomas Kelley, for example, refers to venture philanthropy as the
“better-funded doppelganger of ‘social entrepreneurship.’”25
Philanthrocapitalism appears to represent a second-wave, that is, a
more advanced version of venture philanthropy.
As the portmanteau implies, philanthrocapitalism is a heightened
combination of philanthropy and capitalism. At its core, it describes
an ambitious new movement of charitable giving promoted by ultrarich “social investors, not traditional donors,”26 using big-business
strategies. Among the most prominent faces of philanthrocapitalism
are Bill Gates27 (billionaire founder of Microsoft28), Pierre Omidyar29
(billionaire founder of eBay30), and Eli Broad31 (billionaire founder of
KB Home and SunAmerica, now a subsidiary of the American

entrepreneur”); J. Gregory Dees, The Meaning of “Social Entrepreneurship,” CTR. FOR THE
ADVANCEMENT OF SOC. ENTREPRENEURSHIP (May 30, 2001), http://www.caseatduke.org
/documents/dees_sedef.pdf (describing key elements of social entrepreneurship).
23 See Lisa M. Fairfax, Achieving the Double Bottom Line: A Framework for
Corporations Seeking to Deliver Profits and Public Services, 9 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 199,
200–01 (2004) (discussing double bottom line corporations).
24 See Susan R. Jones, Promoting Social and Economic Justice Through Interdisciplinary
Work in Transactional Law, 14 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 249, 266 (2004) (describing socialventure philanthropy as a venture-capital influence on charitable giving); Christine W. Letts et
al., Virtuous Capital: What Foundations Can Learn from Venture Capitalists, HARV. BUS. REV.,
Mar.–Apr. 1997, at 36.
25 Kelley, supra note 22, at 2464.
26 BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 6.
27 See id. at 51–81 (discussing the world’s largest charitable foundation, headed by Bill
Gates); see also BILL & MELINDA GATES FOUND., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 14.
28 See JAMES WALLACE & JIM ERICKSON, HARD DRIVE: BILL GATES AND THE MAKING
OF THE MICROSOFT EMPIRE (1992); The Forbes 400: Top 10, FORBES, Oct. 6, 2008, at 46, 46.
29 See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 116–24, 134–37 (discussing Omidyar’s
philanthropy); see also Omidyar Network Fund, Inc., I.R.S. Form 990-PF (2008),
http://www.omidyar.com/sites/default/files/file/2008%20990-PF,%20Return%20of%20Private
%20Foundation.pdf (reporting the assets and expenditures of the Omidyar Network Fund).
30 See ADAM COHEN, THE PERFECT STORE: INSIDE EBAY (2002); The Forbes 400: Tech
Titans, FORBES, Oct. 6, 2008, at 168, 172.
31 See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 138–41 (discussing Broad’s philanthropy); see
also THE BROAD FOUNDS., 2008 FOUNDATION REPORT (2009).
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International Group, Inc.32). As depicted by Bishop and Green, the
new philanthrocapitalists “see a world full of big problems that they,
and perhaps only they, can and must put right.”33 These are the kind
of entrepreneurs who are used to large-scale success and now are
seeking to apply that same approach to philanthropy. The concept
encompasses more than just the marginal importation of sound, basic
management principles and high levels of grantor engagement.
Rather, the rhetoric of philanthrocapitalism emphasizes a complete
remaking of philanthropic giving in the image of business, in part by
appropriating business management values (e.g., data focused, results
based, etc.). Philanthrocapitalism has also adopted a belief that
business methods are superior and that experienced, private-sector
business people to replicate corporate achievements in philanthropy.
Bishop and Green describe the present period as a new “golden
age”34 of foundation giving by an elite class of entrepreneurs. The
authors describe the ways in which such giving and the publicity
surrounding it are part of an emerging cultural zeitgeist.35 As a result,
this form of giving—highly engaged grantmaking with a focus on
bottom-line results—is gaining currency, popularity, and devotees.
The charitable-giving style of Bill Gates and Warren Buffett has
become part of a larger global trend, reinforced and supported by new
institutions, such as the Clinton Global Initiative36 and the World
Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland,37 where philanthrocapitalists
gather and exchange notes. According to Bishop and Green, the shift
in philanthropy has been striking: individual philanthropists and
32

See The Forbes 400: Market Masters, FORBES, Oct. 6, 2008, at 246, 250
BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 3 (emphasis added).
34 Id. at 21. The authors also note studies that have demonstrated increased giving by the
superrich and the addition of both new bequests coupled with endowment growth of established
foundations, which have greatly increased the amount of giving by private foundations over the
past fifteen years. See id. at 5–6.
35 See id. at 6, 8–9 (describing new links between philanthropy and media as well as
philanthropy and celebrity); see also Face Value: The Brand of Clinton, ECONOMIST, Sept. 22,
2007, at 84 (“Clinton . . . espouse[s] a businesslike approach to giving money that is now
fashionable among the new rich.”); Liz Hunt, A Lesson in Quietly Doing Good from God’s
Postman, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), Apr. 1, 2008, at 20 (noting that “philanthropy is
fashionable again”); Sherri Begin Welch, Family Foundations on Rise; Creating a Legacy
Among the Benefits, CRAIN’S DETROIT BUS., Nov. 10, 2008, at 24 (quoting an advisor to
wealthy families who stated that “people establish family foundations because they think it’s a
trendy thing” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
36 See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 214–18; see also Philip Rucker, On Eve of
Philanthropy Forum, Clinton Worries About Economy, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2008, at A6
(quoting a corporate executive who stated that the Clinton Global Initiative “creates the idea that
you may be successful as a chief executive of your company . . . , but if you do not think of
philanthropy as part of your job description, you are not cool, you are not good” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
37 See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 175, 217.
33
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corporations are “embracing the profit motive” and “catching the
philanthrocapitalism bug . . . . This is very different from traditional
corporate philanthropy, which has often been ineffective . . . .”38
But just how is philanthrocapitalism new and different? After all,
successful business figures of prior generations founded many of the
largest and most established grantmaking foundations in the United
States. In fact, the “mainstream” foundations that today’s
philanthrocapitalists decry as traditional and ineffective were founded
by the likes of Andrew Carnegie,39 John D. Rockefeller,40 and Will
Kellogg.41 Michael Edwards, a former foundation executive who has
written critically about this new movement, argues that
philanthrocapitalists are drinking from a heady and seductive
cocktail, one part ‘irrational exuberance’ that is characteristic
of market thinking, two parts believing that success in
business equips them to make a similar impact on social
change, a dash or two of the excitement that accompanies any
new solution, and an extra degree of fizz from the oxygen of
publicity.42
Upon close study, three central features of philanthrocapitalism
emerge: (1) the application of business principles to grantmaking,
(2) high engagement by the funder, and (3) the tendency of funders to
seek leverage to expand their spheres of influence. First, a central
feature of philanthrocapitalism (and a key aspect of what supposedly
makes it new and “improved”) is the application of business thinking
and strategy drawn directly from the funder’s personal experience and
success in the private sector. Bishop and Green characterize the spirit
of philanthrocapitalism as “successful entrepreneurs trying to solve
big social problems because they believe they can, and because they
feel they should. . . . [T]hey know how to fix problems, for that is
what they do all day in business.”43 Ultimately, as the project spreads,
Id. at 7.
39 See HAROLD C. LIVESAY, ANDREW CARNEGIE AND THE RISE OF BIG BUSINESS 206
(Mark C. Carnes ed., 3d ed. 2007) (summarizing Andrew Carnegie’s giving over the course of
his life, including the establishment of the Carnegie Foundation); DAVID NASAW, ANDREW
CARNEGIE (2006) (describing the life and work of Andrew Carnegie as a businessman and
philanthropist).
40 See RON CHERNOW, TITAN: THE LIFE OF JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER, SR. 563–70 (2d ed.
2004) (describing the establishment of the Rockefeller Foundation).
41 See WALDEMAR A. NIELSEN, THE BIG FOUNDATIONS 111–14 (1972) (describing
Kellogg’s creation and management of the Kellogg Foundation).
42 Michael Edwards, “Philanthrocapitalism” and Its Limits, INT’L J. NOT-FOR-PROFIT L.,
Apr. 2008, at 22, 23–24.
43 BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 30. Several prominent philanthrocapitalists have
established private foundations with especially ambitious goals. For example, the Bill &
38
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its proponents see a path to a better world, not just because of an
increase in the amount of philanthropy, but also because of an
increase in the quality of philanthropy practiced. Bishop and Green
contend that “one key ingredient of philanthrocapitalism is the
responsibility and willingness of economic winners to . . . apply to
their giving the same talents, knowledge, and intellectual vigor that
made them rich in the first place. Philanthrocapitalism is about being
a businesslike giver.”44 The practitioners of philanthrocapitalism have
developed a new, albeit familiar, language to convey their businessoriented-giving approach. In their hands, “philanthropy is ‘strategic,’
‘market conscious,’ ‘impact oriented,’ [and] ‘knowledge based.’”45
Furthermore, philanthrocapitalism embraces the use of business
and market-based tools, techniques, and methods to address
intractable social problems. Its practitioners talk of applying
“business principles” to the charitable sector to “lift people out of
poverty,”46 and of “apply[ing] the entrepreneurial principles we have
brought to business to charity . . . [to] have a shot at having a really
strong impact, to be able to transform the lives of children.”47 As part
of its business-knows-best philosophy, the movement also seeks
opportunities to harness the profit motive for social problems, when
possible.48
Second, the private foundations backed by philanthrocapitalists
believe in a high engagement—oftentimes a directive—form of
grantmaking. This engagement allows them to exercise substantial
control over the manner and uses of their funding in a drive for
measurable results.49 Drawing on a record of their own business

Melinda Gates Foundation has sought to “find a vaccine that will prevent AIDS, . . . eradicate
malaria, spark an agricultural revolution in Africa and ensure that every child in the United
States has access to a quality education, among other things.” Stephanie Strom, Gates
Foundation Head to Leave Longtime Post, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 2008, at A18. More recently,
Jeffrey Skoll, the first president of eBay and founder of the Skoll Foundation, also formed the
Skoll Urgent Threats Fund to focus on dire global threats like water shortages, pandemics, and
the Middle East conflict. Stephanie Strom, A New Foundation Is Taking Aim at Urgent Threats,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2009, at A18.
44 BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 271.
45 Id. at 6.
46 Douglas McGray, Network Philanthropy: The Men Behind eBay Are Leading a HighTech Revolution That Is Turning Charitable Giving on Its Head, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2007,
(Magazine), at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Pierre Omidyar).
47 Jamie Doward, Can a Friend of the Stars Save British Schools?, OBSERVER (London),
May 29, 2005, at 13 (quoting Arpad Busson, a multi-millionaire hedge-fund executive,
discussing education initiatives).
48 BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 117.
49 See, e.g., Louise Armitstead, Financier’s Pounds 460m Giveaway Fund Manager
Makes Single Biggest Donation to Charity in UK, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), June 21, 2008,
at 1 (describing “the ‘new philanthropists,’ the super-rich who are not only giving away a large
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accomplishments, philanthrocapitalists are focused on results and the
measurable impact of their giving. Although the foundations still
work with and rely on nonprofit public charities to implement work
on the ground, philanthrocapitalism encourages foundations to set the
agenda.50 This hands-on approach to philanthropy is gaining
adherents, and as Part II of this Article demonstrates, is impacting the
manner in which philanthropy is conducted.
The third signature element of philanthrocapitalism is that these
powerful men51 use their influence and personal access to people and
resources to further advance their philanthropic goals.52
Philanthrocapitalists refer to this as “achiev[ing] leverage.” 53 For the
philanthrocapitalists, it is not enough to use their own charitable
giving to direct the pursuit of philanthropic solutions. They also seek
to bring governments, businesses, and other funders to embrace and
support their particular vision and their proposed solutions. Bishop
and Green highlight the importance of leverage:
[E]very philanthrocapitalist talks about the importance of
leverage, and rightly so. . . . The high hopes for
philanthrocapitalism are based on the belief that the wealthy
can be hyperagents, able to achieve impact far greater than
their relative financial resources would suggest by targeting
their dollars . . . [and entering into] [p]artnership[s] with
government, business, or NGOs . . . .54
Accordingly, super-philanthropists also may use their high-profile
giving and “convening power” to form and strengthen a variety of
linkages and relationships: connections with celebrity partners,55

proportion of their wealth but increasingly controlling the charities too”); Daniel Golden,
Teachers’ Pest, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, July 19, 2010, at 58, 60 (quoting University of
Michigan professor Maris Vinovskis who noted that historic benefactors “were not as
prescriptive about how they wanted their money spent” as the new philanthropic billionaires like
Gates, Broad, and others (internal quotation marks omitted)); Jennifer Steinhauer, Wielding Iron
Checkbook to Shape Cultural Los Angeles, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 8, 2010, at C1 (describing Eli
Broad as “[a] billionaire philanthropist whose beneficence comes with not just strings but with
ropes that could moor an ocean liner”).
50 See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 52, 57–59 (noting that Gates, “the ultimate
philanthrocapitalist,” takes an approach in which “the foundation sets policy” on the issues it
funds).
51 I note that virtually all the examples noted by Bishop and Green are men, with the
notable exception of celebrity-philanthropists, referred to as “celanthropists,” Angelina Jolie and
Oprah Winfrey. Id. at 197–98.
52 Id. at 274.
53 Id. at 275.
54 Id. at 274.
55 See, e.g., id. at 204 (quoting Patty Stonesifer, the former CEO of the Bill & Melinda
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contacts with current and former world leaders and public officials,56
and interactions with fellow titans of industry.57 Philanthrocapitalists
view leveraging their personal networks of contacts as the key to
success and believe that it is even more important than the money
they give.58
While the notion that these networks will be put to public uses
may be admirable, the idea that well-practiced philanthropy requires a
powerful Rolodex is troubling. Part of the freedom
philanthrocapitalists have to exercise their power and influence comes
not just from the access to powerful figures, but also from their sense
of independence, a notion that one is virtually unaccountable and
unbound, so long as one abides by the law. This freedom is part and
parcel of the privilege of being superwealthy. Even Bishop and Green
acknowledge that “[a]s hyperagents, the superrich can do things to
help solve the world’s problems that the traditional power elites in
and around government cannot. They are free from the usual
pressures that bear down on politicians and activists and company
bosses with shareholders to please.”59 Thus, these particular taxprivileged foundations, usually heavily dominated by a single,
individual founder, operate without significant accountability to the
public. As explained in Part III.B.1, this can result in an active and
aggressive form of philanthropy, which may undermine democratic
values.
At bottom, philanthrocapitalism is about more than just the
celebration of charitable giving by the wealthy. Rather,
philanthrocapitalism touts a new, more active and assertive style of
giving, driven by a business-like giver bringing his own insight and
direction, vision and solutions, as well as power and access to
produce social change. It is nothing short of an effort to remodel the
prevailing philanthropic patterns by supplying a new language, a new
mindset, and new techniques for addressing social problems. In the
words of Steve Case, the billionaire-turned-philanthropist who

Gates Foundation who stated that “[o]ne of [the Foundation’s] most important partners is Bono
[the lead singer of the prominent rock band U2]” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
56 See, e.g., id. at 214–15.
57 See Ian Wilhelm, Secret Meeting of the Super-Philanthropists, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY,
June 4, 2009, at 34 (describing a private meeting of a dozen billionaires in early May 2009).
58 See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 227 (“In the for-profit world, networking is hot,
online and off-line. Increasingly, the same is true in philanthropy, as some
philanthrocapitalists—Bill Clinton first among them—even believe they can have a greater
impact by leveraging their personal networks of contacts for good than by the money they
give.”).
59 Id. at 255.
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cofounded Internet-services company America Online, Inc. (AOL),60
the movement is designed to “unleash a new entrepreneurial,
collaborative kind of philanthropy . . . [to] create new patterns that
will help reshape the entire system.”61
The calls for a more “strategic” approach to giving have already
advanced several trends in philanthropy, affecting the entire
philanthropic sector, including traditional philanthropy. Established
grantmaking organizations are adopting these concepts and practices
and suffusing them into their own procedures and activities. Private
foundations of all sizes and origins are trying to prove that they are
just as “smart,” “strategic,” and “effective” as this new breed of
philanthropists.62 Beyond the fortunes of Gates and Buffett,
traditional foundation managers are applying the methods of
philanthrocapitalism to “reinvigorate the giving away of fortunes
made by long-dead tycoons.”63
Interestingly, the appropriation of the philanthrocapitalism model
by more traditional grantmakers—such as corporate funders, familyrun foundations, and more established independent foundations—
transforms the phenomenon into something a bit different in the
hands of these users. Lacking the self-made business experience, each
funder has defined the contours of what strategic giving means
somewhat differently. Like philanthrocapitalism, however, these
approaches are still intensely focused on impact, high levels of
engagement, and measurement. Generally speaking, advocates of
strategic philanthropy believe in top-down strategies—“the power of
ideas, persuasively communicated, to influence policy and compel
action”64—as the most effective way to allocate scarce philanthropic
dollars. As characterized by one independent foundation in the field,
many funders are “‘proactive,’ with its practitioners taking the
initiative to craft innovative solutions to significant problems and
engaging in hard-nosed efforts to measure real outcomes.”65 The
strategic approaches can be contrasted with traditional philanthropy,
which frequently contains an express preference for a “responsive”
60 See Hillary Prey, Poor Billionaires, FORBES, Oct. 6, 2008, at 34 (noting Stephen Case
among the list of U.S. billionaires).
61 BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 227.
62 See JOEL L. FLEISHMAN, THE FOUNDATION: A GREAT AMERICAN SECRET 279 (2007)
(noting that trustees have and will continue to push long-established foundations to adopt
methods and practices of philanthrocapitalism).
63 BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 151.
64 TOM DAVID, THE CAL.
WELLNESS FOUND., REFLECTIONS ON STRATEGIC
GRANTMAKING 3 (2000), available at http://www.calwellness.org/assets/docs/reflections
/nov2000.pdf.
65 Id.
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model of grantmaking based on bottom-up strategies emphasizing
“the power of investment in institutional capacity and individual
leadership at the local level”66 to achieve impact.
In this Article, I refer to the more assertive, donor-centric approach
to philanthropy as “muscular philanthropy.” Although money is still
usually directed to various grant-seeking public charities to carry out
charitable work, as in traditional philanthropy, private foundation
grantors operating under this new philanthropy exert their power not
just through their dollars but also through an unspoken sense that they
know best. They assume that smart giving requires a foundation-led
plan of attack on any given problem. It places the foundation at the
center of the social problem-solving endeavor, relegating grantees to
the role of subcontractors expected to execute the grand vision of the
private foundation funder. In contrast, the prevailing conception
attached to traditional (less muscular) incarnations of philanthropy,
with their emphasis on building civil society, has been that of a
coequal partnership, a relationship sometimes successfully achieved
and other times less so. An apt metaphor for the philanthrocapitalism
model would be the manager-subordinate corporate relationship.67
This relationship threatens to turn grant-seeking charities into
constrained participants without full recognition of their value,
autonomy, and expertise.
The choice between the competing relationship frameworks has
consequences for “on the ground” operations. Here is what a large
corporate foundation68 wrote in a document explaining strategic
philanthropy and its view of the relationship between grantors and
grantees:
Donors today have come to expect—and in many cases,
require—that their nonprofit partners not only show the
ability to get the job done, but that they can deliver on their
promises by achieving measurable results. This disciplined
approach can lead to more effective philanthropy . . . . In
certain ways this is a sea change. . . . Increasingly, donors are
now committed to having a real impact in shorter time
periods, and applying fresh thinking and tactics to problems
Id.
Of course I acknowledge that historic relations between foundations and the grantseeking charities have always faced challenges. Accordingly, I do not wish to exaggerate the
“good old days” or present a Pollyanna-ish account of charitable giving before
philanthrocapitalism came along, but I do wish to draw attention to how these different mindsets
affect the influence and voice of nonprofit organizations.
68 For the sake of full disclosure, I must note that I served as the foundation’s chief
operating officer and general counsel earlier in my career.
66
67
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that have eluded conventional approaches. As they take on
the role of change-agents many donors today regard
demonstrable accomplishment as key to their success.69
This passage reveals that many funders in the field have so altered
expectations and behaviors that the foundation community now
recognizes something of a “sea change” in the charitable sector,
acknowledgement that this trend is widely felt. It also reveals that for
some funders, being “disciplined” and “effective” has become
synonymous with holding the grant-receiving charity’s proverbial feet
to the fire, as funders make their expectations explicit and require
delivery of the goods within shorter time frames. Additionally, to
prove their own success, funders see their job as holding grant
recipients accountable to them. Most important, in this version of
strategic philanthropy, it is the donor—not the nonprofit partner in the
field or the constituencies it serves—that takes on the role of the
change-agent and contributes the heralded “fresh thinking and
tactics.”70 The point for now is that, if donors are not careful, this
instrumentalization of charitable organizations to further the
foundation’s goals can reinforce relational hierarchies and
paternalism, placing the voice and expertise of operating nonprofits in
the background, and leaving those closest to the problems on the
ground disempowered.
I do not mean to imply that philanthrocapitalists and other donors
using strategic methods do not value the contributions of the
nonprofit organizations they support. They do. That same corporate
primer on strategic philanthropy cited earlier goes on to state,
“Through strategic philanthropy, the Foundation seeks to promote
effectiveness of the organizations it supports. . . . Our success is
derived from the passion, energy, and intellect of the Foundation’s
Board and staff and those of the organizations we support.”71 The
important question, however, is: To what extent are the supported
nonprofits treated as equal partners? Are they valued as resources and
issue experts, freely contributing their best ideas? Or are they merely
seen as excellent subcontractors executing the foundation’s vision?
Philanthrocapitalist rhetoric suggests that foundations should consider
grant-receiving nonprofits as merely passionate implementers, and
69 THE GOLDMAN SACHS FOUND., MAXIMIZING IMPACT: A PRIMER ON STRATEGIC
PHILANTHROPY 1, available at http://wwwqa2.goldmansachs.com/citizenship/philanthropy/pub
lications-and-resources/other-publications/maximizing-impact-primer-on-strategic-philanthropy
.pdf (last visited Jan 10, 2011).
70 Id.
71 Id. at 20
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encourage them to leave the high-level problem solving and direction
setting to the foundation; this vision, however, opens the new
philanthropy to long-standing left-leaning criticisms of philanthropy
that depict it as a tool of the powerful used to control the
disenfranchised and entrench powerful interests.72
The philanthrocapitalism movement and the broader reinvention of
the institution of philanthropy have implications for lawyering and
governance. These shifts in grantmaking practices are in response to a
variety of pressures and criticisms of traditional philanthropy. Thus,
philanthrocapitalism and strategic philanthropy have roots—even if
not exclusively so—in calls for accountability.73 The appeal of
philanthrocapitalism has been driven by questions about the
legitimacy of perpetual private foundations in a democratic society,
by calls that private foundations demonstrate their added value, and
by demands that they use the tax-privileged dollars under their control
effectively and wisely. So far the dialogue about philanthrocapitalism
has been fairly muted, perhaps because “nobody wants to bite the
hand that feeds them or seem out of step with the latest fashions of
the funders.”74 Yet all people should be concerned—including
lawyers who populate foundation board rooms and counsel wealthy
individuals in establishing grantmaking foundations.
II. TRENDS IN FOUNDATION GIVING
Although still relatively new, the principles embodied by
philanthrocapitalism and strategic grantmaking are beginning to
infiltrate deep within the charitable-giving sector. One report on
72 See Alice Gresham Bullock, Taxes, Social Policy and Philanthropy: The Untapped
Potential of Middle- and Low-Income Generosity, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 325, 343–45
(1997) (describing philanthropic giving as a means to perpetuate the interests and concerns of
the wealthy); Rob Reich, Philanthropy and Its Uneasy Relation to Equality, in TAKING
PHILANTHROPY SERIOUSLY: BEYOND NOBLE INTENTIONS TO RESPONSIBLE GIVING 27, 30
(William Damon & Susan Verducci eds., 2006) (“Left-wing critics, especially those of a
Gramscian bent, have long suggested that philanthropy is but another self-interested way for the
powerful to continue their dominion over the poor and entrench the ideological interests of the
wealthy in all of society.”).
73 See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Enron.org: Why Sarbanes-Oxley Will Not Ensure
Comprehensive Nonprofit Accountability, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 205, 272 (2004) (noting that
private foundations represent the “segment of the nonprofit sector [that] is often singled out as
most prone to accountability failures”); Michael E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, Philanthropy’s
New Agenda: Creating Value, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.–Dec. 1999, at 121 (questioning
“[w]hether foundations are fulfilling their potential”); Jon Christensen, Exploring New Ideas for
Making Finances Clearer and Scandals Rarer, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2003, at F16
(“Everywhere you turn in the world of philanthropy and nonprofits these days, people are
talking about accountability.”).
74 MICHAEL EDWARDS, SMALL CHANGE: WHY BUSINESS WON’T SAVE THE WORLD, at
viii (2010).
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strategic philanthropy noted the following two “typical comments”
from a series of conversations with nonprofit agency leaders:
“Funders are not open to genuine dialogue and tend to
discount what we know. Program officers are more interested
in giving us advice than in listening to us.”
“Top-down, foundation-driven initiatives are tying up more
and more dollars, cutting down the pool of funds available for
unsolicited ideas and grants.”75
To determine whether these complaints are widespread enough to
reflect significant shifts, I analyzed a series of recent trends in
foundation giving. My analysis identifies three trends that indicate the
growing influence of philanthrocapitalism and the type of muscular
philanthropy lamented by many nonprofit agency directors. First,
foundations are concentrating their grantmaking76 by devoting
proportionally more resources to larger and larger projects. Second,
they are asserting more control over the use of the grant funds they
disperse through the use of limited-purpose grants.77 Third, they are
becoming increasingly closed to the ideas and innovations proposed
by nonprofit organizations operating on the ground, working directly
on the critical social issues.78 Although no single trend confirms the
ascendency of philanthrocapitalism, taken together they demonstrate
that private foundations in general are moving toward practices that
allow them to exercise greater, rather than less, control over nonprofit
activity. These trends are consistent with and indicative of the broader
shift toward muscular philanthropy, in which foundations
increasingly treat grantees more like contractors than partners.
I do not mean to suggest that general operating support is always
preferable to program support, that small grants are somehow better
than large grants, or that foundations should never approach potential
grant recipients with project ideas. Each of these practices (large
grants, program support, proposal invitations) has value and may be
appropriately used by grantmakers under certain circumstances.
These data, however, present a larger picture of the trends in
grantmaking and uncover shifts in the power dynamics between
private foundations and grant-seeking nonprofit organizations and
raise questions about how these new arrangements will affect public
charities and the people they serve.
75
76
77
78

DAVID, supra note 64, at 2.
See infra Figures 1–2 and Table 1.
See infra Figures 3–4.
See infra Figures 5–6.
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A. Increased Concentration of Large Grants
Over the past decade or so, private foundations have tended to
concentrate their grants by awarding more funding to the selected
recipients. Specifically, the Foundation Center, which tracks the
giving of more than 1000 large foundations each year,79 reports a
substantial increase in the number of exceptionally large grants.
Figure 1 shows that the raw number of grants of $5 million or more in
their sample study increased by 572% between 1997 and 2008.
During that same period, the raw number of $10 million-or-more
grants saw a 919% increase.80 Although grantmaking grew during this
period, Table 1 demonstrates that the increase was not nearly as
sharp; the raw number of all grants increased by just 90.7% and the
total dollar value of all grants increased by 218%.81
The data from the sample funders also demonstrates that the
combined dollar value allocation to these megagrants increased by
862% from 1997 to 2008.82 As indicated above, during this same
period, the total dollar value of all grants increased by only 218%.83
As a consequence of this move to exceptionally large grants, the
percentage of total grant dollars allotted to megagrants has increased
as well. Figure 2 demonstrates this trend. In 1997, grants of $5
million or more constituted only 9.9% of total grant dollars in the
sample; by 2008, that percentage had risen to 29.9%.84 In other
words, for every $1 in grantmaking activity by the largest foundations
in the U.S. approximately 10 cents went to megagrants in the late

79 The Foundation Center’s annual study is based on a sample of large foundations. For
example, the 2008 sampling base included more than 800 of the 1000 largest foundations and
the fifteen largest foundations in nearly every state, ranked by total grant giving and a sampling
of other foundations. Consequently, the sample is not a “stratified random sample” of the
nation’s full foundation community. In addition, the composition of the set varies from year to
year. See STEVEN LAWRENCE & REINA MUKAI, FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS:
UPDATE ON FUNDING PRIORITIES 39–40 (2010) [hereinafter FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS
2010]. As a result, the data “should be interpreted as suggestive of grantmaking trends across the
United States—especially among larger foundations—but not conclusive.” See id. at 40. Yet the
Foundation Center’s figures still offer important data to study general trends in foundation
giving.
80 See Figure 1. Without fuller data from the Foundation Center’s annual samples, which
are unpublished, I am not able to conduct more sophisticated measures of concentration.
81 See Table 1.
82 Grants of $5 million or more in 1997 totaled more than $785 million. See LOREN RENZ
ET AL., FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GIVING: YEARBOOK OF FACTS AND FIGURES ON PRIVATE,
CORPORATE, AND COMMUNITY FOUNDATIONS 78 (1999) [hereinafter FOUNDATION GIVING
YEARBOOK 1999]. In 2008, grants of $5 million or more totaled more than $7.55 billion. See
FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2010, supra note 79, at 2.
83 See Table 1.
84 See Figure 2.
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1990s and by the late 2000s nearly thirty cents of each dollar is
allocated to the very largest grants.
Although these data reflect a healthy growth in private foundations
and U.S. grantmaking in general, the focus should be on the much
more dramatic growth of large grants, which reflects a change in
giving practices in the philanthropic sector. This growth in the
number and value of megagrants, when compared to the substantially
slower growth of the total number and value of all grants, tells us that
grantmakers are directing relatively more resources to larger projects,
perhaps at the expense of other worthwhile but smaller projects. The
overall growth in foundation giving over the past decade or so, fueled
by a booming stock market and the creation of new foundations,85
masks the fact that proportionally, the number of grants has not kept
apace with the growth in dollars given or the proliferation of
exceptionally large grants.
Furthermore, Figure 1 shows that in just the past few years the
number of grants of $10 million or more has increased greatly. It
increased by 20.5% between 2006 and 2007, and another 13.8%
between 2007 and 2008.86 This contrasts with the much slower
growth in the number of all grants: 7.0% and 8.3% for those same two
time periods, respectively.87
In terms of the total dollar value of these very large grants, the
Foundation Center reports that in 2008 the total value of the $10
million-or more-grants from sampled funders reached a record of $5.5
billion,88 a 34% increase from the prior year.89 By comparison, the
total value of all grants increased a more modest 16.7% over that
time.90 And in particular, grants under $50,000 increased only 11% to
$2 billion.91 This direct comparison of large-dollar grants and smalldollar grants indicates an increased concentration in large grants.

85 See FOUNDATION GROWTH AND GIVING 2010, supra note 17, at 4 (noting that the
number of U.S. grantmaking foundations has increased steadily since the early 1980s and more
sharply during the economic boom years of the late 1990s).
86 See Figure 1.
87 See Table 1.
88 FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2010, supra note 79, at 1.
89 STEVEN LAWRENCE ET AL., FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON
FUNDING PRIORITIES 1 (2009) [hereinafter FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2009] (reporting $4.1
billion to grants of $10 million or more).
90 See Table 1.
91 FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2009, supra note 89, at 1 [hereinafter FOUNDATION
GIVING TRENDS 2009]; FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2010, supra note 79, at 1.
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Figure 1. Change in Number of Larger Grants Awarded, 1997 to 200892

Figure 2. Percentage of Total Dollars Allocated to Grants of $5 Million or More,
1997 to 200893

92 This chart is reprinted from data presented in FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2009,
supra note 89, at 1 and FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2010, supra note 79, at 1.
93 These data are drawn from the following sources. FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2010,
supra note 79, at 2. FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2009, supra note 89, at 2; JOSEFINA ATIENZA
& REINA MUKAI, FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON FUNDING
PRIORITIES 1 (2008) [hereinafter FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2008]; JOSEFINA ATIENZA ET
AL., FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON FUNDING PRIORITIES 1 (2007)
[hereinafter FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2007]; JOSEFINA ATIENZA & ASHLEY BAILEY,
FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON FUNDING PRIORITIES 1 (2006)
[hereinafter FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2006]; JOSEFINA ATIENZA & JENNIE ALTMAN,
FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON FUNDING PRIORITIES 2 (2005)
[hereinafter FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2005]; JOSEFINA ATIENZA & LESLIE MARINO,
FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON FUNDING PRIORITIES 2 (2004)
[hereinafter FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2004]; JOSEFINA ATIENZA & LESLIE MARINO,
FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON FUNDING PRIORITIES 2 (2003)
[hereinafter FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2003]; STEVEN LAWRENCE & DIA GANGULY,
FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON FUNDING PRIORITIES 2 (2002)
[hereinafter FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2002]; STEVEN LAWRENCE ET AL., FOUND. CTR.,
FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON FUNDING PRIORITIES 2 (2001) [hereinafter
FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2001]; STEVEN LAWRENCE ET AL., FOUND. CTR., FOUNDATION
GIVING TRENDS: UPDATE ON FUNDING PRIORITIES 2 (2000) [hereinafter FOUNDATION GIVING
TRENDS 2000]; FOUNDATION GIVING YEARBOOK 1999, supra note 82, at 78.
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Table 1. Distribution of Total Sampled Grants in Dollars and Number,
1997 to 200894

B. Growth of Limited-Purpose Grants
Driven largely by a determination to prove impact from their
grantmaking, many grantmakers are increasingly making limitedpurpose grants to narrowly circumscribed projects. These “program
support” grants restrict the uses of money to a greater degree than
“general support” grants, which nonprofits may use at their discretion
for a variety of purposes. A 2007 study of America’s wealthiest
foundations indicated that foundation management felt greater
pressure from trustees and others to measure the effectiveness of their
grantmaking. These pressures led them to favor restricted giving
because proving effectiveness is more difficult with unrestricted
giving.95 In addition, program-support grants allows foundations to
exert control over donees by dictating the purposes for which funding
may be used. Many donors restrict their giving to specific uses to
94 These data are drawn from the following sources. FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2010,
supra note 79, at 36; FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2009, supra note 89, at 36; FOUNDATION
GIVING TRENDS 2008, supra note 93, at 57; FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2007, supra note 93,
at 68; FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2006, supra note 93, at 72; FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS
2005, supra note 93, at 57; FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2004, supra note 93, at 58;
FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2003, supra note 93, at 63; FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2002,
supra note 93, at 64; FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2001, supra note 93, at 54; FOUNDATION
GIVING TRENDS 2000, supra note 93, at 50; FOUNDATION GIVING YEARBOOK 1999, supra note
82, at 114.
95 JUDY HUANG ET AL., CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE PHILANTHROPY, IN SEARCH OF IMPACT:
PRACTICES AND PERCEPTIONS IN FOUNDATIONS’ PROVISION OF PROGRAM AND OPERATING
GRANTS TO NONPROFITS 8–9 (2006), available at http://www.effectivephilanthropy.org/assets
/pdfs/CEP_InSearchOfImpact.pdf.
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ensure greater accountability and to attempt to prove a grant’s
impact.96 My analysis of the giving patterns of the past several years
indicates that large private foundations are increasingly favoring more
restrictive funding over unrestricted general operating support.
The reported data compares the percentage of overall giving
allocated to general support and program support in a given year from
the total overall distribution of grants. It does not address changes on
an absolute dollar basis. On an absolute dollar basis, both general and
program support are on the rise because of the growing number of
grantmaking foundations. Examining the data on a proportional basis
does, however, provide information on relative growth or
contraction—which reflects the shifts in overall funder preferences.
Figure 3. Distribution of General Support Grants as a Percentage of Total
Grantmaking by All Foundation Types, 2003 to 200897

96 See id. (discussing the results of a survey of foundation CEOs in which “[e]ase of
assessing outcomes” was frequently cited as the rationale for their expressed preference for
program support); FRUMKIN, supra note 8, at 191 (discussing donor beliefs that program
support “make[s] accountabilty, reporting, and assessment easier”).
97 These data are drawn from the following sources. FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2010,
supra note 79, at 31; FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2009, supra note 89, at 31; FOUNDATION
GIVING TRENDS 2008, supra note 93, at 36; FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2007, supra note 93,
at 40; FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2006, supra note 93, at 42; FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS
2005, supra note 93, at 36.
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Figure 4. Distribution of Program Support Grants as a Percentage of
Total Grantmaking by All Foundation Types, 2003 to 200898

Figure 3 shows that the proportion of foundation funding by the
sampled foundations allocated to general support has declined
slightly. It displays the distribution of general-support grants as a
percentage of total giving by all foundation types, measured in grant
dollars and number of grants, for the six-year period covering 2003 to
2008. While the percentage of grants for general support by number
has remained relatively flat, Figure 3 shows that by grant dollars, the
general support distribution is decreasing relative to other areas. In
comparison, Figure 4 shows program support levels for the same
group of foundations. It illustrates that the dollar allocation to grants
for program support is on the rise. From 2003 to 2008, the proportion
of total foundation spending on program support has increased by
more than six percentage points, while the number of such grants has
increased by less than one percentage point. Thus, the Foundation
Center’s statistics suggest that as foundations shift toward larger
grants,99 they also are directing more and more of their grant funds to
restricted purposes.
C.

Expansion of Foundation-Initiated Grantmaking

Another increasingly popular trend is proactive grantmaking. The
idea behind this trend is that effective funders should not sit around
and wait for good ideas to reach a program officer’s desk; instead
98 These data are drawn from the following sources. FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2010,
supra note 79, at 31; FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2009, supra note 89, at 31; FOUNDATION
GIVING TRENDS 2008, supra note 93, at 36; FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2007, supra note 93,
at 40; FOUNDATION GIVING TRENDS 2006, supra note 93, at 42.
99 See supra Part II.A.
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they should employ a proactive, foundation-initiated approach to
finding the recipient-organizations they want to carry out their project
ideas. Therefore, some proactive donors simply contact specific
nonprofit organizations and invite submissions. Others have used a
modified request for proposal (RFP) system: the RFPs describe “in
great detail what the donor wants to accomplish and how the program
should be carried out.”100 Like the other trends documented in this
Part, the move toward foundation-initiated grantmaking projects often
stems from a desire to be considered strategic or to prove impact.101
This Section presents the results of a study of foundation policies
regarding their openness to unsolicited grant proposals. The data
reveal that closed and semi-closed grant-proposal policies, which
were exceedingly rare fifteen years ago, are becoming significantly
more common. Although time consuming for foundation staff, openapplication processes allow funders to be responsive to the needs and
ideas of public charities. In contrast, proactive grantmaking, despite
its efficiencies, is subject to criticism because it “appears to assume
that the donor knows more about how to solve a given social problem
than the service delivery community in the field.”102 Below I briefly
describe the methods of data collection and then report the principal
findings.
1. Method
The analysis is based on comparisons of two paired sets of data on
proposal-acceptance policies of foundations. It offers a sense of the
foundation sector’s openness to ideas and potential solutions offered
by community-based organizations and other organizations as the
guiding source for funded projects.
The first paired set compares the proposal-acceptance policies of
the largest independent103 and corporate foundations104 in 1994 and
100 FRUMKIN,

supra note 8, at 194.
JOEL J. OROSZ, THE INSIDER’S GUIDE TO GRANTMAKING: HOW FOUNDATIONS
FIND, FUND, AND MANAGE EFFECTIVE PROGRAMS 26–28 (2000) (labeling the most extreme
version of this as “peremptory” and describing a “[w]e fund the best we can imagine, and no
others need apply” attitude as “extremely strategic”); see also CONRAD N. HILTON FOUND., For
Grantseekers, http://www.hiltonfoundation.org/grantmaking/grantseekers (last visited Mar. 1,
2011) (“The Foundation does not encourage unsolicited proposals for funding. . . . This
proactive approach helps us maximize effectiveness and impact.”); COMMUNITY FOUND.
SARASOTA COUNTY (FL), Competitive Grantmaking, https://www.cfsarasota.org/grants
/competitivegrantmaking/tabid/291/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 1, 2011) (noting that because
donors are “requiring more accountability and impact” the foundation shifted “from a largely
‘reactive’ to a more ‘proactive’ approach to grantmaking”).
102 FRUMKIN, supra note 8, at 194.
103 An independent foundation refers to a private nonoperating foundation that does not
directly deliver any charitable programs or services. By far the largest type of foundation,
101 See
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2008. For this comparison, the populations included all independent
and corporate foundations on the lists of the 100 largest foundations
by total giving and by asset size from the 1994 and 2008 editions of
the Foundation Directory.105 Those lists generated a population of
116 foundations for 1994 and 90 foundations for 2008, after
community foundations106 and private operating foundations107 were
excluded.
In addition to examining the very largest foundations, I also sought
to review the practices of a broader cross section of independent and
corporate foundations. The second set of data also looks at grantacceptance practices, but compares two randomly drawn samples of
100 independent and corporate foundations with a wider range of
sizes. Again, community foundations and private operating
foundations were excluded, as well as foundations with assets of less
than $10 million. The random samples were also drawn from the
1994 and 2008 editions of the Foundation Directory.108
For both data sets, a research assistant examined each entry in the
directory to determine whether the foundation indicated that grant
recipients were selected (1) by invitation only, (2) primarily by
invitation with unsolicited proposals rarely funded, or (3) by an open
selection process designated in the Directory as “Accepting
Applications.” All of the data was compiled in July and August 2009.

independent foundations make grants supported by an endowment; they usually do not raise
funds or seek grants. Generally, they receive funding primarily from one source, such as an
individual or a family. A private foundation is required to distribute approximately 5% of its
assets annually to public charities or their equivalents. See I.R.C. § 4942 (2006) (imposing a tax
on a private foundation’s undistributed income).
104 A corporate foundation is a private foundation subject to all of the same laws and
regulations as an independent foundation. In the field, the name suggests that instead of
receiving funding from an individual or family, the primary funding source is a corporation.
105 See FOUND. CTR., THE FOUNDATION DIRECTORY: 1994 EDITION (Margaret Mary
Feczko & Elizabeth H. Rich eds., 16th ed. 1994); FOUND. CTR., THE FOUNDATION DIRECTORY:
2008 EDITION (David G. Jacobs ed., 30th ed. 2008).
106 A community foundation is classified as a public charity rather than as a private
foundation. Instead of receiving most of its funding from a single source like independent
foundations, corporate foundations, and operating foundations, community foundations seek
funding from many individuals to engage in grantmaking focused on a particular geographic
area. See I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A)(vi).
107 A private operating foundation is a private foundation that primarily carries out its own
charitable programs, like a publicly supported charity, instead of engaging in grantmaking. The
operating foundation must spend substantially all of its income on the activities for which it is
organized and operated. See I.R.C. § 4942(j)(3) (defining an “operating foundation”).
108 In selecting the foundations to be included in the sample, I used the identification
numbers assigned to each foundation in the directory. I then used an Internet-based research
random-sampling program to select the foundations for inclusion while minimizing bias. See
RESEARCH RANDOMIZER, http://www.randomizer.org (last visited Mar. 3, 2011).
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2. Data and Summary Results
Figure 5 presents the percentage distribution of grant-application
policies for the largest independent and corporate foundations in 1994
and 2008. The charts reveal that just 6% of all large foundations had
an invitation-only grant policy in 1994. By 2008, that percentage had
increased to 29%. This sizeable and statistically significant
difference109 demonstrates that today’s large foundations are
substantially more likely to have a “don’t call us, we’ll find you”
approach when it comes to application practices and interaction with
potential grantees.
Collecting the same data on a broader set of foundations, I found
similar results. In 1994, only 10% of the sampled foundations had
adopted a proactive grantmaking style in which they declined to
consider unsolicited proposals. As shown in Figure 6, by 2008 nearly
half (48%) of the independent and corporate foundations sampled
reported that their grantmaking was overwhelmingly foundation
initiated. In this set, the difference was also statistically significant.110
Figure 5. Distribution of Application-Acceptance Practices
of the Largest Independent and Corporate Foundations,
1994 and 2008

109 The difference between the paired population sets of large foundations was statistically
significant at the 1% significance level in a two-tailed test.
110 The difference between the paired random samples of foundations was statistically
significant at the 1% significance level in a two-tailed test.
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Figure 6. Distribution of Application-Acceptance Practices of Independent and
Corporate Foundations from a Random Sample of 100 Foundations,
1994 and 2008.

The foundations studied were more than four times as likely to
have adopted an invitation-only grant-screening policy in 2008 as in
the mid-1990s.
3. Limitations of the Study
This study necessarily is limited by the data and the data sources,
and a few observations are worth noting. First, although foundations
may have formal invitation-only grant-proposal policies, they may
invite competition among potential grantees through targeted RFP
competitions. Sometimes advertised and open to any applicant
meeting the proposal guidelines and sometimes limited to a number
of preselected organizations, the use of RFPs is nevertheless generally
considered a form of proactive, foundation-driven grantmaking.111 A
foundation that regularly uses this method as the means for grantee
organizations to put their own ideas in front of funders may be
classified as “invitation only” in the directory. Second, some
foundations that require an invitation for a full “formal” proposal do
meet with organizations, review preliminary letters of inquiry, or
engage in other informal communications with a wide range of
organizations. Thus, there may be varying degrees of openness to
public charities at a pre-grant proposal stage by private foundations
with an “invitation only” policy. Third, the quality of the data is
limited by the reliability of the information regarding proposal
acceptance listed in the Directory. As a general reference source on
thousands of U.S. private foundations, some of the underlying profile
111 See

FRUMKIN, supra note 8, at 194.
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information may be out of date, mistaken, or misreported. That being
said, I have no reason to suspect any material differences between the
1994 and 2008 versions.
These limitations underscore the often complex and idiosyncratic
relationships between private foundations and grant-seeking entities.
Although the study documents formal policies as published in the
directory of foundations, the interactions on the ground may be more
nuanced and complicated. Whatever the nuances, however, there has
been a rather dramatic shift in the stated formal policies on proposal
acceptance announced in the Directory; this suggests that the
practices and disposition of many grantmakers has shifted.
D. Implications
Together, Figures 1 and 2 and Table 1 show that large foundations
are increasing both the absolute and proportional amount of grant
dollars allocated to exceptionally large grants. Although not every
grantmaker is capable of awarding grants at the $10 million-plus
level, foundations of all sizes appear to be expressly moving toward
making fewer grants in larger amounts.112 When foundations alter
their grantmaking philosophy by shifting toward larger grants, they
most often justify the approach by arguing that a smaller number of
larger grants produces greater societal impact.113
This efficiency argument is complicated, however, by considering
who might be harmed by such reallocations and what cultural changes
might result. On the one hand, many foundations view the shift to
larger grants as a smart, tactical “move away from disjointed and
dissipated gift giving” and an acknowledgment of the reality that
some projects may require significant resources to achieve certain
objectives.114 On the other hand, however, this shift may leave certain
112 See, e.g., Press Release, Wash. Reg’l Ass’n of Grantmakers, Grantmakers in
Washington Region Anticipate Making Fewer, But Larger Grants in 2009 (Nov. 12, 2008),
available at http://www.washingtongrantmakers.org/s_wash/bin.asp?CID=4501&DID=21499&
DOC=FILE.PDF (stating that 47% of D.C.-area private foundations anticipated making fewer
but larger grants).
113 See Justin Cord Hayes, Foundation Changing Philosophy About Grants: The High
Point Community Foundation Will Award Larger Grants to Fewer Agencies, GREENSBORO
NEWS & REC. (N.C.), Aug. 11, 2004, at A1 (quoting the executive director’s explanation of the
foundation’s policy shift as “Our grants committee has decided it wants to be able to award
large enough grants to have a significant impact on programs that could dramatically change the
quality of life in[the community]”); Randy Krehbiel, Foundation Makes Its Point: $25.5 Million
Grant to UA Aims at Big Impact in Geriatrics, TULSA WORLD, Feb. 5, 1997, at A-1 (quoting a
local foundation’s executive director who explained that while “[m]ost foundations give much
smaller amounts to more organizations,” his particular foundation did not because “[o]ur
trustees determined they wanted to truly make an impact” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
114 FRUMKIN, supra note 8, at 193.
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groups out. Pablo Eisenberg, a senior fellow at Georgetown
University’s Center for Public & Nonprofit Leadership, argues that
“[f]ar fewer awards will go to local community-organizing groups
and to nascent, small nonprofit groups.”115 After all, with larger grants
come higher stakes, which often lead funders toward accepting less
risk, at least with respect to interacting with new or marginalized
groups. The high stakes also may encourage foundation staff to adopt
a more hands-on approach in an attempt to protect their
“investment.”116 The concentration on big projects suggests an
underlying belief that we already have the answers to big problems,
but lack the funding to solve them. It neglects, however, the real
possibility that we do not yet have the solutions and that we need
more experimentation and innovation, a mindset that cuts toward less
concentration. In this view, the problem is that accountability
pressures on individual foundations—from board members and
others—now push foundations toward big grants, ignoring the
benefits of spreading the wealth.
The final point is that the large-grant trend may also unwittingly
encourage private foundations to place themselves more firmly in the
driver’s seat. When a foundation makes a systematic decision to give
larger grants to a smaller and more selective number of organizations,
there is an unstated presumption that the grantmaker will chose grant
recipients wisely. Thus, at least in part, the move signals a
foundation’s heightened confidence in its ability to make high-risk
philanthropic bets. Significantly, the dollar values associated with
what constitutes “large” and “small” grants are relative terms, almost
always defined from the perspective of the donor foundation (using
its historic baselines) rather than that of the recipient charity. In this
respect, the decision to shift toward larger grants reinforces the
foundation-centric orientation I see as endemic to the new
philanthropy.
115 Pablo Eisenberg, Editorial, A Foundation’s Attempt to Make a Difference May Produce
the Opposite Result, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Nov. 29, 2007, at 33.
116 Some foundations, in an attempt to embrace philanthrocapitalism principles, have
begun to think of or refer to grants as investments. See, e.g., The Legatum Found., Our Mission,
http://www.legatum.org/OurApproach.aspx (last visited April 8, 2011); The Rhode Island
Found., Strategy Grants, http://www.rifoundation.org/Nonprofits/GrantOpportunities/Strategy
Grants/tabid/350/Default.aspx (last visited Apr. 8, 2011); Press Release, Social Venture
Partners, Social Venture Partners Continues to Grow and Give −$26.5 Million in Grant
Investments Made to More than 300 Nonprofit Organizations (June 17, 2008), available at
http://www.svpbouldercounty.org/files/SVP%20Network%20Grants%20$26%205M_0.pdf; see
also Sean Stannard-Stockton, Op-Ed, Providing the Capital Organizations Need to Run — and
Grow, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Oct. 1, 2009, at 37 (“As many philanthropists have rushed to
use the currently trendy vocabulary of financial investments when they talk about giving, the
meaning of the word “investment” has become confused.”).

1/13/2011 11:14:11 PM

2011]

WHO’S AFRAID OF PHILANTHROCAPITALISM?

33

For public charities seeking grants, the shift toward more project
funding and relatively less unrestricted general support by private
foundations, as reflected in Figures 3 and 4, creates significant
conflicts and challenges. The narrow tailoring of program grants
requires detailed planning in the early stages, which can benefit an
organization in the execution phase. This diversion of effort makes it
more difficult to devote resources to organizational capacity building
or to sustain on-going core activities, however.117 The problem is
exacerbated by the fact that most grant-seeking charities attempt to
limit internal administrative (i.e., overhead or organizational)
expenses because the nonprofit marketplace already penalizes
organizations if their administrative-to-program expense ratio appears
high.118 Thus, if grantmakers’ focus on program support begins to
detract from support for general operations, it also begins to convey
the message that investments in recruiting and retaining high-quality
staff, developing infrastructure to support activities, and other forms
of organizational capacity-building are not valued.119
Grantseekers have long faced tremendous variability in dealing
with grant application processes as they searched for funding. Figures
117 See FRUMKIN, supra note 8, at 192 (“As more and more funders have sought leverage
through project giving, some nonprofits have complained about the difficulty of sustaining core
activities.”).
118 See Jeffrey L. Bradach et al., Delivering on the Promise of Nonprofits, HARV. BUS.
REV., Dec. 2008, at 88, 91, 97 (describing how donors’ preference that their contributions go to
programs has resulted in the proliferation of new programs and the underinvestment in overhead
expenses); see also Evelyn Brody, The Twilight of Organizational Form for Charity: Musings
On Norman Silber, A Corporate Form of Freedom: The Emergence of the Modern Nonprofit
Sector, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1261, 1270–71 (2002) (book review) (discussing pressures
stemming from misunderstanding of overhead expenses); Elizabeth Schwinn, Americans Say
Charities Spend Too Much on Overhead, Poll Finds, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Mar. 6, 2008, at
29 (“Sixty-two percent of Americans think that charities spend too much money on overhead
costs such as fund raising and administration . . . .”). But see CTR. ON PHILANTHROPY AT IND.
UNIV., PAYING FOR OVERHEAD STUDY 1 (2007), available at http://www.philanthropy.iupui.
edu/research/33537%20Rev%20Overheard%20Book.pdf (“[While n]onprofit professionals
believe that foundations prefer to pay for program expenses instead of overhead expenses. . . .
more than two-thirds (69 percent) of responding foundations indicated they are willing to fund
all types of nonprofit overhead expenses. . . . Still, 64.5 percent of foundations report they do
not have a history of funding administrative costs.”).
119
There are some high-profile exceptions to this trend that have placed an emphasis on
capacity-building grants for nonprofit organizations, such as the Edna McConnell Clark
Foundation. See Ben Gose, A Singular Focus on Kids, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Feb. 9, 2006, at
7, 13 (describing the Foundation’s grantmaking strategy which is focused on unrestricted grants
with grantees “encouraged to use [funds] to develop their central-office capabilities”). It is also
worth noting that some notable philanthrocapitalists have engaged in capacity-building
grantmaking. But, general support and capacity-building grants are not considered the same by
grant recipients. General support provides the recipient with full discretion to use funding as it
determines necessary usually to meet on-going needs whereas “[c]apacity-building grants are
synonymous with change” intended to alter the organization in some specific way. Lee Draper,
When Capacity-Building Grants Flatline, FOUND. NEWS & COMMENT., May/June 2003,
available at http://www.foundationnews.org/CME/ article.cfm?ID=2489.
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5 and 6 reveal that increasingly foundations are creating a new hurdle
by adopting invitation-only policies with respect to grant requests.
Suggestions that proactive grantmaking is somehow more rigorous or
strategic are unproven and dubious. The answers to most community
problems do not rest in the offices of foundation staff; grantmakers
that think they hold all the solutions may end up imposing them on
communities without the support or engagement necessary for
sustained success. From my perspective, the increase in invitationonly grant-proposal policies, especially when combined with the
increase in large grants and restricted-purpose grants, signal the
degree to which foundations are more assertively using their power
and placing themselves in the driver’s seat to control the agenda of
nonprofit-sector projects. This quiet shift seems to say something
important about the confidence funders have in their ability to
envision and initiate effective problem solving from the top down.
In the final analysis, philanthrocapitalism may not be the cause for
each of these three trends, but the movement has encouraged and
accelerated the expansion of several of these practices, particularly as
certain tenets—most notably the emphasis on measurable impact—
morph and are reinterpreted by other foundations and their trustees.
The deeper, underlying connection I see between these trends and the
rhetoric and practices so closely identified with philanthrocapitalism
and strategic grantmaking is the emphasis on the funder’s needs,
desires, goals, and power. It is this subtle turn toward a more
foundation-centric approach to problem solving that muffles the
voices of the nonprofit organizations working in the field and the
communities they serve. The philosophy of philanthrocapitalism
positions being “strategic” against being “responsive” to community
needs, as those needs are articulated by the nonprofit organizations
that work most closely with them. But these objectives are not
necessarily opposites and should not be viewed as working against
each other.
III. THE DANGERS OF PHILANTHROCAPITALISM
Philanthropy is at a critical moment of reinvention. The extensive
financial resources and prominent visibility of those represented by
“new philanthropy” certainly make their reforms worthy of careful
scrutiny. The advocates of philanthrocapitalism believe that the new
business-oriented, foundation-focused approach to giving will free
nonprofits “to think long-term, to go against conventional wisdom,
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[and] to take up ideas too risky for government.”120 My less sanguine
view is that by overemphasizing these goals—casting them as
requisites for effectiveness—they may be too easily misappropriated
or misinterpreted by grantmaking foundations and end up
undermining efforts to strengthen the nonprofit sector. This Part
discusses several concerns associated with the corporatization of
philanthropy and how the tenets of philanthrocapitalism and the
muscular philanthropy it encourages may negatively impact the
effectiveness of the nonprofit sector, generate spillover effects that
erode or skew individual giving and government support for social
change, and alter the ways in which we think about philanthropic and
democratic values.
A. Misapplication of Business Concepts
1. Overemphasizing Metrics
We have seen that proponents of philanthrocapitalism often
differentiate themselves from other socially minded actors, including
more traditional philanthropic entities, by describing their efforts as
uniquely “results-oriented.”121 In doing so, they imply that others
either do not really care about results and outcomes or that others
measure things that are less important, e.g., inputs. Many have praised
this focus on metrics as a hard-nosed and business-savvy approach to
grantmaking,122 and there is little doubt that the trend is spreading.123
120

See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 12.
See, e.g., BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 87 (quoting a philanthrocapitalist from the
hedge fund industry); HELMUT K. ANHEIER & DIANA LEAT, CREATIVE PHILANTHROPY 21
(2006) (“The new philanthropists are generally results-oriented. . .”).
122 See, e.g., ANHEIER & LEAT, supra note 121, at 21 (“[T]here seems to be some
indication that aspects of the new ‘bottom-line thinking’ are proving to be a valuable addition to
the nonprofit sector’s operations because it creates a new way of thinking and operating that, in
the long term, could be a value-added commodity.”); Peter Wilby, It’s Better to Give Than
Receive, NEW STATESMAN (U.K.), Mar. 24, 2008, at 17 (“The 21st-century philanthropists take
a more hard-nosed approach to giving. They behave like investors . . . [looking for] ‘social
return.’”).
123 See generally Raymond H. Brescia, Sheltering Counsel: Towards a Right to a Lawyer
in Eviction Proceedings, 25 TOURO L. REV. 187, 240–41 (2009) (discussing the philanthropic
sector’s “greater emphasis on measurable results”); Jon Gertner, For Good, Measure, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2008, § 6 (Magazine), at 62 (describing the “push for measurements, or
‘metrics,’” within philanthropy and the influence of the “radical . . . handful of foundations that
have begun to approach philanthropy the way a money manager might, considering . . . whether
a grant can result in a good ‘return’ on investment”); William A. Schambra, Op-Ed., Big
Philanthropy Has Reasons to Fear Populist Fervor, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Feb. 25, 2010
(“[F]oundations and their grantees are themselves deliberately becoming more like big business,
adopting [a] very measurement-obsessed approach . . . .”); Adam Thomas, Nonprofits Face
Important Challenges, Smith Says as Conference Opens, STATES NEWS SERVICE, Mar. 23, 2010
(paraphrasing Steven Rathgeb Smith, the Waldemar A. Nielson Chair in Philanthropy at
Georgetown University who delivered the opening keynote address for the “Future of the
121
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One legal scholar pithily observes that “[o]ld-style charity is out.
Performance metrics[ and] business jargon . . . are in.”124 However, it
is important to state the obvious: an overemphasis on metrics and an
insistent effort to measure things that sometimes, by their very nature,
cannot be measured can end up harming rather than improving
philanthropy.
My point is not to argue that assessment and measurement are
wholly out of place in the social sector. Rather, the point is simply
that the lack of universal measures such as profit—so easily applied
in the for-profit world—makes nonprofit assessment far more
complex.125 Philanthrocapitalism seems to fail to acknowledge such
difficulties and to advance the myth that the measurement of
nonprofit performance and goals is merely a matter of discipline, will,
and intellectual power.
Funders should remain mindful of the fact that not all desirable
social outcomes can be easily or accurately measured. Instead, the
goals of philanthropic work reach beyond concrete, instrumentalized
targets set by a stern manager, and extend to such intangible ideals as
community empowerment, justice, creativity, compassion,
expression, preservation of legacies, or the like. For example,
Professors Scott Cummings and Deborah Rhode have noted this
difficulty of accurate performance measurement is particularly
evident in many public-interest legal contexts, where they ask, “How
do we price due process?”126 When charitable programs address
intangible ideals, they are usually seeking to intervene in a complex
network of activities that make up vast social and economic systems.
I am not persuaded that either foundations or experienced business
executives can successfully reduce these goals into accurately
measurable component parts without risking oversimplification,
distortion, or the devaluing of those ideals. Like it or not, success is
complicated, and public goods are not easily reducible to categories
similar to those used to calculate profits.
Furthermore, many outcomes cannot be predicted in advance or
determined in the short term, and the correlation between a

Nonprofit Sector in Delaware and the Nation” Conference, as saying that “government and
private funders [are] placing more emphasis on evaluation and performance measurements”).
124 Pozen, supra note 22, at 321.
125 See Deborah L. Rhode, Rethinking the Public in Lawyers’ Public Service: Pro Bono,
Strategic Philanthropy, and the Bottom Line, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1451 (2009)
(discussing the difficulty of quantifying the “social return” on an investment).
126 Scott L. Cummings & Deborah L. Rhode, Public Interest Litigation: Insights from
Theory and Practice, 36 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 603, 634 (2009).
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contribution and specific outcomes is not always clear. For example,
one traditional philanthropic technique, which ironically has been
embraced by philanthrocapitalism, has been the use of prizes.127 But
one of the most prominent prize initiatives, widely viewed as
successful, does not lend itself well to outcome measurement. The
John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation’s Fellows Program,
often referred to by the nickname “the genius awards,”128 provides
unrestricted, “no strings attached” grants “to talented individuals who
have shown extraordinary originality and dedication in their creative
pursuits and a marked capacity for self-direction.”129 In a volume
describing some of the most important and influential examples of
foundation grantmaking initiatives, the authors acknowledge that “the
[MacArthur Fellows] program’s effectiveness [is] difficult to
judge. . . . [E]ach MacArthur fellowship is a risk, the return on which
is impossible to determine.”130 Yet, despite these measurement
challenges, most observers have little problem in considering the
prestigious program “an investment well-made.”131
A further concern is that even when we think we have designed
appropriate metrics, experience has shown that we may not have
included relevant variables or that we cannot predict the proper
measures in advance. Take the example of the Children’s Television
Workshop (CTW), which created Sesame Street—unquestionably one
of the most successful developments in educational television
programming, and originally funded by the Ford Foundation and the
Carnegie Corporation.132 The early reports determined that Sesame
Street failed to meet its primary measurable strategic objective,
namely, to close the educational gap between minority and
underprivileged children and middle-class children.133 Thus, it was
labeled a failure in some circles because it did not meet its key metric.
Under the philanthrocapitalism model, CTW might have had its
funding cut off because of its failure to deliver the promised results.
In this instance, however, it turned out that it was the metric that was
the problem, not the program’s effectiveness. In fact, Sesame Street
127 See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 112–13 (“Philanthrocapitalists believe that
incentive prizes can potentially leverage their money many times over.”).
128 See, e.g., Nicole Wallace, Founder of Rural Health Clinic Is Among 25 Winners of
‘Genius’ Grants, CHRON. PHILANTRHOPY, Oct. 2, 2008, at 39.
129 THE JOHN D. & CATHERINE T. MACARTHUR FOUND., 2008 REPORT ON ACTIVITIES 74
(2009).
130 JOEL L. FLEISHMAN ET AL., CASEBOOK FOR THE FOUNDATION: A GREAT AMERICAN
SECRET 164 (2007).
131 Id.
132 Id. at 99.
133 Id. at 101.
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was improving educational outcomes for millions of disadvantaged
children. The problem was that all children—black and white, rich
and poor alike—were drawn to the program, thereby neutralizing the
intended compensatory effect and actually exacerbating the
educational gap.134
The lesson here is that even when the parties agree on reliable
metrics, how the metrics are used matters. Flexible metrics can be
helpful tools in the field if those closest to the ground need to have
control over them. Grantees need to be empowered to critique and
change plans, directions, and even the metrics themselves when
necessary. Flexible metrics can guide operating nonprofits and their
funders, working collaboratively. Conversely, rigid metrics used to
discipline grant recipients undermine relationships and limit the
usefulness of measurement. If metrics are used primarily as a topdown tool to evaluate charities (i.e., to punish organizations if the
foundation’s goals are not achieved), the narrow focus on specific
measurements may backfire and “may inhibit learning from
experience and degrade performance.”135 Although this distinction is
not made to make claims about the experiences of all funders, it
illustrates the tensions and risks associated with attempts to measure
social impact.
Even more troubling are the negative side effects associated with
an emphasis on nonprofit performance measurement. Simply put, it
makes people preoccupied with achieving specific goals. While in
some instances such intense focus may yield positive results, it can
also cause people to narrow their focus in ways that may be harmful
to larger objectives or values.136 As a result, charities, under pressure
from funders, can become so focused on achieving specific targets or
metrics that they run the risk of losing sight of broader goals, which
may be related or unrelated to measured targets. Findings from
several well-known studies of inattentional blindness illustrate the
point. These studies document the phenomenon of people being
unable to perceive things in plain sight because they are so focused on
a particular task.137 Similarly, a heightened emphasis on a small
134 See

id. at 101.
D. Ordóñez et al., Goals Gone Wild: The Systematic Side Effects of
Overprescribing Goal Setting, ACAD. MGMT. PERSP., Feb. 2009, at 6, 11.
136 See, e.g., id. at 8 (“With goals, people narrow their focus. This intense focus can blind
people to important issues that appear unrelated to the goal . . . .”).
137 See Jean R. Sternlight & Jennifer Robbennolt, Good Lawyers Should Be Good
Psychologists: Insights for Interviewing and Counseling Clients, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP.
RESOL. 437, 450 (2008) (describing a psychology study in which people were asked to watch a
video of two three-person teams passing a basketball and to count the passes; nearly half of
those watching failed to notice that a gorilla or person with an umbrella walked through the
135 Lisa
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number of high-stakes metrics might diminish the ability of nonprofit
executives to focus on other matters and to engage in creative
problem solving. For example, in the elementary-education context, a
foundation focused on easily available performance measures might
cause a grantee charter school to focus narrowly on hitting certain
standardized test targets in verbal and math skills. Such a focus,
however, could inadvertently cause the charity to fail to see or
address shortcomings in other areas, such as critical reasoning,
writing, higher-order problem solving, creativity, or leadership
development skills.138
Additionally, overemphasis on measurement may lead
organizations to focus on what is easily measured rather than what is
most important. This distortion may be especially pronounced as
foundations “invest” through a smaller number of high-dollar grants,
giving funders greater power.139 The emphasis on measurable results
may make grantseekers “reluctant to ‘swing for the fences’ on
‘complicated, messy, seemingly insoluble problems’ where charitable
funds and creativity are most needed.”140 Measurement frenzy may
also incentivize charities to ignore groups or peoples deemed difficult
to reach.
Put differently, measurement in the social sector is immensely
complicated. Often, attempts to measure the immeasurable do not
answer the hard questions, fail to measure what planners hope to
capture, or skew behavior in unintentional ways. Sometimes the
process of measurement imposes rigidity on a fluid and dynamic
social process and naively attempts to govern or control complex,
interrelated systems and events to an extent that is simply not
realistic.141 In the excitement of this more pronounced emphasis on
metrics as an accountability tool, proponents have largely overstated
the benefits of performance measurement, while understating its
harms. Indeed the business world customarily privileges market

game); see also Daniel J. Simons & Christopher F. Chabris, Gorilla in Our Midst: Sustained
Inattentional Blindness for Dynamic Events, 28 PERCEPTION 1059 (1999) (discussing same).
138 For a discussion on the pitfalls of measurement pressures in elementary and secondary
education, see generally Philip T.K. Daniel & Maurice R. Dyson, Bringing Every Child
Forward: Lessons Learned Under No Child Left Behind & a Roadmap for Obama’s
Educational Reform, 19 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 63 (2009); Liz Hollingworth,
Unintended Educational and Social Consequences of the No Child Left Behind Act, 12 J.
GENDER, RACE & JUST. 311 (2009); James E. Ryan, Standards, Testing, and School Finance
Litigation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1223 (2008).
139 See supra Part II.
140 Cummings & Rhode, supra note 126, at 635.
141 See, e.g., Debora Spar & James Dail, Of Measurement and Mission: Accounting for
Performance in Non-Governmental Organizations, 3 CHI. J. INT’L L. 171, 178 (2002).
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share, growth rates, and investment rates of return over
empowerment, participation, and the quality of relationships—but
civil society may not benefit from the same approach to
philanthropy.142 As this trend grows “it is conceivable that
philanthropy itself might be demeaned by a process that depends less
and less on the bond of trust between . . . a foundation and its
beneficiary and more and more on an algorithm that calculates the
quantitative return on a grant.”143
Statistics and measurement have a place in philanthropy, but I
worry that the language and approach of philanthrocapitalism may
overemphasize their effectiveness and obfuscate their appropriate
role. A philanthropic culture dominated by quantifiable targets can
significantly harm overall performance rather than promote better
solutions. Metrics can sometimes be used effectively by
philanthropists. In some settings, they can provide helpful
information for problem diagnosis or midcourse corrections, but too
many foundations have become “obsessed with”144 measurement in
ways that demean and undermine the very philanthropy they seek to
advance.
2. Capturing the Meaning of “Strategy”
Philanthrocapitalism equates “serious” philanthropy with the
adoption of business principles.145 There is no question that
grantmaking is serious work, but that alone does not make it the
province of business. In other words, business and market-based
practices and processes have no monopoly on effectiveness.
A central problem with the rhetoric of philanthrocapitalism is that
it mistakenly conflates “businesslike” and “strategy,” two concepts
that should not be presumed to go hand-in-hand. Those who have
worked in and with many for-profit businesses as well as nonprofit
organizations understand that sound analytical thinking and wise
decision making may be found in both sectors, just as bastions of
mediocrity may also be found.146 Especially with the hindsight of the
142 See EDWARDS, supra note 74, at 77–78 (questioning what happens to democratic
accountability when private foundations take over the task of solving social problems).
143 Gertner, supra note 123, at 74.
144 Id.
145 See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 273 (“The real worry about philanthrocapitalism
is not that the new generation of big givers will be too businesslike, but that they will not be
businesslike enough. If philanthrocapitalism is to succeed, it will be because these
philanthropists . . . apply their business talents just as rigorously as they did when they made
their money.”).
146 See, e.g., JIM COLLINS, GOOD TO GREAT AND THE SOCIAL SECTORS 1 (2005) (rejecting
the “well-intentioned, but dead wrong” idea that social sectors can be strengthened by the
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recent financial crisis, we know that private enterprise does not hold
all the answers.
Profit maximization lies at the heart of capitalism, while
philanthropy is concerned with altruism and the betterment of
humankind.147 When philanthrocapitalism glorifies business models
and practices as the standard for excellence and effectiveness, it
misses this crucial difference and inevitably disparages the nonprofit
sector. It is important that we guard against efforts to co-opt broad,
positive terms like “strategic” or “effective” and turn them into
synonyms for businesslike or market-based.
B. Transforming Nonprofit Institutions
1. Foundation vs. Charity Expertise
Although the nonprofit sector is a central element of American life
and is steadily gaining recognition, it remains one of the least
understood and most undervalued elements.148 Unfortunately, the
rhetoric and tenets of philanthrocapitalism only exacerbate the
problem. Just beneath the surface of efforts to incorporate business
and the market into charitable giving lies an attack on traditional
foundations, and in some iterations, there may also be an implicit
attack on public charities as well. While perhaps not intentional, the
new muscular philanthropy casts most nonprofit organizations as
crisis-prone, desperately poor, starry-eyed, even witless do-gooders.
This characterization can lead to condescension and fractured
relationships.149 Of course, I should be careful not to overstate this
point. It must be remembered that funders are still, for the most part,
conducting their philanthropic work through grantee public charities,
money and power differentials have always caused strains in grantor-

simple importation of commonly accepted business practices).
147 See ROBERT H. BREMNER, AMERICAN PHILANTHROPY 3 (2d ed. 1988) (“The aim of
philanthropy . . . is improvement in the quality of human life.”); Robert L. Payton,
Philanthropic Values, in 4 PHILANTHROPY: PRIVATE MEANS, PUBLIC ENDS 21, 23 (Kenneth W.
Thompson ed., 1987) (arguing that philanthropy is more concerned with the long-term
betterment of mankind than in alleviating short-term problems).
148 See LESTER M. SALAMON, THE RESILIENT SECTOR: THE STATE OF NONPROFIT
AMERICA 7 (2003) (“If the nonprofit sector is one of the most important components of
American life, it is also one of the least understood.”); Garry W. Jenkins, The Powerful
Possibilities of Nonprofit Mergers: Supporting Strategic Consolidation Through Law and
Public Policy, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1089, 1090 (2001).
149 See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 135 (quoting a former executive of a foundation
closely associated with philanthrocapitalism who described the foundation’s leadership as “very
condescending to nonprofits” and noting that “[s]uch comments are not atypical”).
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grantee relationships,150 and some small nonprofits (as well as small
businesses) do fit the stereotype. However, the language and methods
of philanthrocapitalism do emphasize the unique ability of an elite
class of funders to employ their business know-how because “they
know how to fix problems, for that is what they do all day in
business.”151 This idolization of business skills and experience
coupled with a desire to ensure that the funder remains firmly in the
driver’s seat in the grantor-grantee relationship152 heightens the sense
among both funders and their recipients that there has been a shift in
the locus of control in that relationship. Put bluntly,
philanthrocapitalism seems to encourage the myth of a huge gap in
the strategic expertise, sophistication, and level of quality between
business entities and nonprofit organizations. To accept that view, of
course, leaves us with a weakened, essentialized view of nonprofit
organizations. Accordingly, philanthrocapitalism may inadvertently
advance a notion that grant-recipient charities, almost by definition,
lack clearheadedness and thus should only be instrumentalized to
achieve the foundation’s objectives.
This characterization—even if only implied—is particularly
damaging because it is happening at a moment in time when the
stature and standing of nonprofit organizations has been on the rise in
many circles.153 The case for the emerging strength of the nonprofit
sector has been stronger during this period than at any other time in
history. Simply put, the underestimation of nonprofit effectiveness
embedded in philanthrocapitalism is in sharp contradiction to a
growing discourse and acknowledgment over the past three decades
that an increasing number of nonprofit organizations are becoming
world class. In several arenas, for instance on the international stage,
150 See Kent D. Fairfield & Kennard T. Wing, Collaboration in Foundation GrantorGrantee Relationships, 19 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 27, 28–29 (2008) (describing the
sometimes-poor state of foundation-charity relationships); Garry W. Jenkins, Soft Power,
Strategic Security, and International Philanthropy, 85 N.C. L. REV. 773, 830 (2007) (noting the
problems that arise from “unequal power dynamics” between foundations and grantees).
151 BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 30.
152 See id. at 57 (describing the typical philanthrocapitalist approach to engagement as one
in which “the foundation sets policy and provides funding, but others do the work on the
ground”).
153 See, e.g., SHAMIMA AHMED & DAVID POTTER, NGOS IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 37
(2006) (discussing the new roles—beyond traditional disaster-relief work—played by nonprofit
organizations that “have greatly expanded the opportunity for the voluntary sector’s influence in
international politics”); NGOS AT THE TABLE: STRATEGIES FOR INFLUENCING POLICIES IN
AREAS OF CONFLICT passim (Mari Fitzduff & Cheyanne Church eds., 2004) (discussing the vast
number of nonprofit organizations working internationally and their status as a vital component
of both local and international responses to conflicts); Christiana Ochoa, The Individual and
Customary International Law Formation, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 119, 124 (2007) (noting the
increasing prominence of nongovernmental organizations).
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nonprofits are becoming powerful players, respected by governments
and corporations as equals at the table. For example, from the vantage
point of the U.S. presidency, Bill Clinton has stated that the influence
of the charitable sector “has been reinforced by the proven ability of
[nonprofit organizations] of all sizes and missions to have a positive
effect on problems at home and abroad.”154
In its most extreme forms, strategic philanthropy is excessively
controlling. Foundations that seek to impose their vision, their
strategic frameworks, and their metrics on a nonprofit grant recipient
is often unduly intrusive and may thereby weaken the organizations
they are funding. Of course, only a few foundations may have pushed
this model to its extremes, but it serves as a reminder that a
foundation’s drive to achieve results can have negative effects.
Moreover, as I noted above in Part II, in recent years a significant
percentage of foundations have shifted to a “don’t call us, we’ll call
you” philosophy of considering grant proposals.155 Rather than just an
effort to streamline administrative processes, this is an important shift
toward a more muscular philanthropy, with funders calling the shots
and perhaps closing themselves off from creative ideas.
Peter Laugharn, an experienced international foundation executive,
has criticized the style of philanthropy favored by
philanthrocapitalists because “the funder may not have sufficient
understanding of situations and actors to achieve its goals, or enough
flexibility to adjust its approach when necessary.”156 He warns that an
overly proactive approach can become “directive, essentially turning
grantees into contractors, and running the risk of ignoring the
partners’ strength.”157 This disregard of partner’s strengths is
surprising given how proponents of philanthrocapitalism frequently
invoke the language of entrepreneurship and risk taking. For
example, when Bishop and Green explain that philanthrocapitalism
hews to the view that “[t]he best philanthropy often involves taking
risks, and more risk means more failures, as well as (hopefully) more
successes,”158 I am left to wonder whose risks they are referring to—
the foundation’s or the public charity’s? For all the talk about its
embrace of risk taking, philanthrocapitalism seems primarily
interested in solutions philanthrocapitalists formulate. They seem to
consider themselves as the ultimate risk takers, not the nonprofit
institutions they support. Furthermore, they do not seem to consider
154 BILL
155 See

CLINTON, GIVING: HOW EACH OF US CAN CHANGE THE WORLD 11 (2007).
supra Part II.C.
Laugharn, Proactive vs Responsive Philanthropy, ALLIANCE, Sept. 2008, at 44.

156 Peter
157 Id.

158 BISHOP

& GREEN, supra note 5, at 79.
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the risk that comes with undervaluing the contributions and ignoring
the ideas of those closer to the ground.
When it comes to addressing social problems, nonprofit
organizations operating on the ground—i.e., public charities—have a
central role to play. Society benefits from institutional arrangements
that seek innovation coming not only from the top, where they are
centrally planned by a grantmaking foundation, but also from the
bottom, where those organizations working most directly on public
problems are continuously refining, modifying, and improving design
solutions. As several scholars note, those who drive social innovation
are often those closest to the ground, who have direct contact with the
challenges that need to be addressed.159 Professor Angela Banks’s
observation about participatory decision making in constitution
making fits the nonprofit world as well, where the exercise of tight
control by private foundations can deprive operating nonprofits of the
space they need for “innovative solutions and approaches to problems
. . . that are qualitatively better than the solutions and approaches
developed in elite or exclusive settings.”160 Such space is even more
important when the philanthropy focuses on issues of poverty, social
justice, and community building, because it requires strong
community-based organizations and locally grounded mediating
institutions.161
If donors are serious about strengthening the capacity of the
charitable sector, an essential precursor to “taking successful projects
to scale,” is that they should seek to conduct their philanthropy in
ways that support the development of worthy nonprofits as they
formulate and pursue their own solutions based on their experience,
knowledge of problems, direct contact with beneficiaries, and visions
for social change. As Sheela Patel, the founder and executive director
159 See, e.g., Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 314 (1998) (arguing that innovation is spurred by
those closest to problems); Susan Sturm, Gender Equity Regimes and the Architecture of
Learning, in LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 323, 325 (Gráinne de Búrca
& Joanne Scott eds., 2006) (describing benefits of bottom-up, participatory innovation).
160 Angela M. Banks, Expanding Participation in Constitution Making: Challenges and
Opportunities, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1043, 1050 (2008) (discussing the advantages of
participatory decision making); see also Archon Fung & Erik Olin Wright, Deepening
Democracy: Innovations in Empowered Participatory Governance, 29 POL. & SOC’Y 5, 18
(2001) (noting the benefits of bottom-up solutions).
161 See Pablo Eisenberg, Philanthropy and Community Building, 87 NAT’L CIVIC REV.
169, 169 (1998), reprinted in PABLO EISENBERG, CHALLENGES FOR NONPROFITS AND
PHILANTHROPY: THE COURAGE TO CHANGE 126 (Stacy Palmer ed., 2005) (noting that the “most
important” lesson from urban development philanthropy is that community residents must be a
major part of community problem solving); Paul Horwitz, Churches as First Amendment
Institutions: Of Sovereignty and Spheres, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 108 (2009) (arguing
that mediating institutions serve a vital role in maintaining a sense of community).
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of a nonprofit organization in India working on global poverty relief,
writes, “[A] fundamental question donors need to ask is this: [D]o
they want subcontractors to carry out their mission? Or do they want
to support those who have a vision for their own transformation?”162
Grantmakers who seek to set the agenda themselves may test their
preferred solutions, but in so doing may also stifle creativity and
ambition. Grantmaking at its best employs practices that most
effectively help nonprofits achieve their missions.
Consider, for example, the different approaches of the Bill &
Melinda Gates Foundation and the Ford Foundation. The Gates
Foundation, the nation’s largest private foundation,163 which is
invoked as a paradigmatic example of philanthrocapitalistic
grantmaking,164 plays an assertive role in setting the philanthropic
agenda of the grantmaking it underwrites.165 For example, in
November 2008, the Gates Foundation announced that it planned to
shift the focus of its education grantmaking from structural change
(i.e., the creation of small high schools) toward an effort to double the
number of low-income young people who complete a college degree
or certificate by age twenty-six.166
What I find interesting in this example is that both the former and
the new focus of the Gates Foundation grantmaking is so driven by
the foundation and its view of the most effective solution to problems
in the U.S. public education system. Here, the Gates Foundation is
employing an approach characteristic of philanthrocapitalism—that
is, it acts largely on its own167 to determine a single strategy for
education reform (a theory of change), it does the heavy lifting of
developing potential solutions, and then it goes out to find or create
organizations to execute its agenda. Notice that “[t]he new approach
162 Sheela

Patel, Subcontractors or Visionaries, ALLIANCE, Sept. 2008, at 36, 36.
Top 100 U.S. Foundations by Asset Size, FOUND. CTR. (Feb. 22, 2011),
http://foundationcenter.org/findfunders/topfunders/top100assets.html.
164 See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 52 (noting that “Gates has . . . become the
ultimate philanthrocapitalist”); Joe Nocera, Self-Made Philanthropists, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9,
2008, § 6 (Magazine), at 60 (referring to Gates as “[t]he quintessential philanthrocapitalist”).
165 See, e.g., Julie Schmit, Inside the Gates Foundation; It Has $35 Billion to Give, and
Strong Ideas About How to Do It, USA TODAY, June 2, 2010, at 6A (“[T]he Gates Foundation
has been painted by critics and even admirers as sometimes too heavy-handed in saying how its
money is used and too prone to listening to the recommendations of experts vs. grass-roots
groups when setting its strategies . . . .”).
166
See Ben Gose, Gates Foundation Unveils New Approach Designed to Improve
American Education, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Nov. 27, 2008, at 10.
167 I do not mean to imply that the Gates Foundation does not consult with experts. Rather,
they make decisions and find nonprofit grantees to execute their vision after the fact. Observers
have described the Foundation’s decision-making process as “a closed internal process.” See
Donald G. McNeil, Jr., W.H.O. Official Complains of Gates Foundation Dominance in Malaria
Research, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2008, at A6 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dr.
Arata Kochi of the World Health Organization).
163 See
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reflects the foundation’s view that the decade beginning in high
school and ending at about age 26 is a make-or-break period for lowincome youths.”168 Notably, the Gates Foundation declared its shift
without the announcement of any specific or even potential grantees.
Prior to that November announcement, the Foundation had been
executing a strategy based on its theory of change that creating
smaller high schools would improve education outcomes. In both
cases, the Foundation defines the problem, sets the agenda, devises
the strategy, and determines how long it should take to solve the
problem. Finding grantee organizations to execute the Foundation’s
chosen experiment is the last piece of the puzzle.
In contrast, the Ford Foundation—the nation’s second-largest
private foundation169 and a favorite target of the new-guard
philanthropists170—takes a different approach. As any regular listener
of National Public Radio well knows, the Ford Foundation has long
sought to summarize its ethos with the tagline “a resource for
innovative people and institutions worldwide,”171 and more recently,
as an organization “[w]orking with [v]isionaries on the [f]rontlines of
[s]ocial [c]hange [w]orldwide.”172 These slogans capture and
emphasize the Ford Foundation’s focus on embracing the ideas of the
public charities. Therefore, even in describing its own mission, the
language clearly places the grant-recipients and their innovative ideas
at the center of the problem-solving activity undertaken on any given
issue.173 An example of this approach is cited by Harvard researcher
Steven Lawry in a recent article in the Stanford Social Innovation
Review, wherein he describes the Ford Foundation’s initial support
for Muhammad Yunus and his Grameen Bank, eventual winners of
the Nobel Peace Prize, which sparked the microfinance movement.174
168 Gose,

supra note 166, at 10 (emphasis added).
supra note 163.
BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 158 (describing the Ford Foundation’s
grantmaking as an example of “unstrategic funding”).
171 FORD FOUND., 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2008).
172 FORD FOUND., 2008 ANNUAL REPORT 1 (2009); see also Ian Wilhelm, Slogans Teach
Public-Radio Listeners About Grant Makers’ Missions, CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Oct. 1, 2009,
at 1 (describing the change in slogans).
173 See Susan V. Berresford, President, Ford Found., Address at the Nat’l Found. India,
Philanthropy’s Potential: Can We Grasp It? (Mar. 4, 2002), available at http://www.fordfound.
org/newsroom/speeches/118 (“Grantmakers will have to become braver about seeking and
supporting people with unfamiliar approaches and stick with them long enough to learn about
them. As donors become more strategic in tackling important and difficult problems, they will
need good advice from people who know how to bring about change, including the most
disadvantaged men and women who are the likely beneficiaries. We must remember the Ford
Foundation is not the answer—it is a resource for people who have ideas about the answer.”).
174 See Steven Lawry, Effective Funding: How Foundations Can Best Support Social
Innovators, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Spring 2009, at 21 (describing the Ford
Foundation’s partnership with Grameen Bank).
169 See
170 See
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Lawry notes that although the Ford Foundation funding was
important, the grant recipient led the way. It was Yunus who
developed the idea, took the lead, and provided the expertise to craft a
solution to a public problem.175 Lawry argues that this success
demonstrates that “foundations should open their doors wide to the
potentially powerful ideas”176 of grant recipients, whose visions,
ideas, and plans are tested and borne out of “the complex social,
economic, and political environments in which they live and work.”177
In my view, the key difference between the approaches is mindset.
Distilled down to its most simple terms, in one approach the
foundation perceives itself as an expert decisionmaker using its
resources to implement chosen technical solutions; in the other, the
foundation is the facilitator, using its resources to empower
organizations and communities on the ground to focus on adaptive
work.178 These two examples highlight some potential long-term
problems with muscular philanthropy. It is not that muscular
philanthropy never achieves positive results—it most surely does.
Sometimes a foundation may adopt a winning strategy. But such a
myopic approach is underinclusive in promoting social innovation. As
Lawry writes:
Innovative grantees, who have the advantages of local
knowledge, intuitive insights into local social and
institutional dynamics, and social and professional standing
in their communities, are in a better position than foundations
to push and pull the levers that move other essential
institutions toward adopting the kinds of pro-poor policies
necessary for their ideas to work.179
In addition, the trends discussed in Part II suggest that U.S.
foundations are adopting policies and practices that may decrease
competition and may isolate these entities from the ideas and
expertise of organizations working most closely on the ground,
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Id.
178 See RONALD A. HEIFETZ, LEADERSHIP WITHOUT EASY ANSWERS 22, 72–76 (1994)
(distinguishing “technical work” which employs authoritative expertise and mechanical knowhow or established procedures to solve problems from “adaptive work” which requires people
with the problems to engage in a process to solve problems where they learn new ways, i.e.,
attitudes, behaviors, relationships, etc., internalize the change through experimentation and
discovery); RONALD A. HEIFETZ & MARTY LINSKY, LEADERSHIP ON THE LINE: STAYING ALIVE
THROUGH THE DANGERS OF LEADING 13–15 (2002) (making a similar distinction between
adaptive and technical work).
179 Lawry, supra note 174, at 22.

1/13/2011 11:14:11 PM

48

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:3

reducing the prospects for innovation from the bottom to emerge.
There is evidence that grantmakers are limiting the pool of ideas that
receive consideration and exerting greater control over the projects
that they ultimately choose to fund. When foundations instead pick
which entities they will hear from and which organizations they will
interact with via invitations for proposals,180 they reduce the
competition in the marketplace of social ideas. Collectively
foundations are choosing to concentrate on larger grants, often
awarding fewer numbers of grants than in the past and giving the
selected projects larger dollar awards.181 These practices may lend
themselves to a decrease in experimentation and innovation in the
social sector.
Many have applauded the shift to more concentrated grantmaking
as a means to bring more focus to philanthropy and to provide
grantees more funding to pursue large-scale initiatives. Of course,
foundation leaders have always faced a breadth-versus-depth trade-off
in grantmaking.182 It remains open for debate, however, whether this
is a sign of a maturing nonprofit sector coalescing around promising
ideas or simply overconfidence in the grantmakers’ self-perceived
ability to place charitable bets. Finally, by focusing on targeted
limited-purpose grants,183 short-term measurable outcomes,184
leverage, and high engagement, foundations have taken on the
attributes of a hierarchical, directive, centralized power, usurping both
the autonomy and energy of the public charities on the ground. In an
attempt to push the venture capital analogy,185 funders are using their
power advantage over their grantees to exercise control (sometimes
aggressively so) over grantee behavior186 and, in some cases, to
dictate public policy. Even the World Health Organization, the
powerful public health arm of the United Nations, has expressed
worry that the Gates Foundation has created a “cartel” in health
research that “discourages smaller rivals and intellectual
competition.”187 Similar concerns have been raised about the Gates
Foundation’s work in other areas as well.188

180 See

supra Part II.C.
supra notes 79–93 and accompanying text.
182 See JOEL J. OROSZ, EFFECTIVE FOUNDATION MANAGEMENT 93–95 (2007).
183 See supra Part II.B.
184 See supra Part III.A.1.
185 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
186 See supra text accompanying notes 164–81.
187 BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 72 (internal quotation marks omitted).
188 See e.g., Schmit, supra note 165 (noting a similar concern expressed regarding work on
world hunger issues).
181 See
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In many respects, philanthrocapitalism conflicts with the
preference for experimentation and the aversion to command-andcontrol-style management often associated with free-market
economic theories.189 Once shorn of the philosophical and structural
strengths of free-market principles, what remains of
philanthrocapitalism is exceedingly narrow and elitist in scope. Thus
even on its own terms, philanthrocapitalism is not likely to recreate
the conditions we associate with effective free markets but instead
will likely lead only to a concentration of power and decision making
in the hands of business elites.
2. Market-Based Solutions
Philanthrocapitalism, like any movement or theory, embodies a set
of explicit and implicit values. It expresses a preference for
entrepreneurial, market-oriented solutions, places an emphasis on
performance measurement, and attaches overriding importance to the
guidance of experienced business leaders. To the extent that
philanthrocapitalism espouses this new set of values, it seeks to alter
the nature of grantmaking as well as the social change projects and
experiments undertaken with foundation dollars; funders shape both
what nonprofits do and how they conduct their activities. These new
189 Free-market-based principles and policies have been embraced because of their ability
to foster environments that value decentralization over command-and-control approaches,
encourage creative competition, and promote innovation through experimentation. See, e.g.,
Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property for Market Experimentation, 83
N.Y.U. L. REV. 337, 347 (2008); Amy J. Cohen, Dispute Systems Design, Neoliberalism, and
the Problem of Scale, 14 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 51, 57 (2009); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal:
The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN.
L. REV. 342, 369, 443 (2004); Amy Sinden, The Tragedy of the Commons and the Myth of a
Private Property Solution, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 533, 536–537 (2007). Accordingly, traditional
adherents to market-based principles have long championed environments that cultivate
learning, broad-based experimentation, and open competition to promote innovation. Friedrich
Hayek, one of the leading free-market economists of the twentieth century, wrote that

to do more harm than good . . . to improve the social order, [we] . . . will therefore
have to use what knowledge [we] can achieve, not to shape the results as the
craftsman shapes his handiwork, but rather to cultivate a growth by providing the
appropriate environment, in the manner in which the gardener does this for his
plants.
F.A. HAYEK, NEW STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND THE HISTORY OF IDEAS
34 (1978); see also Amy J. Cohen, Governance Legalism: Hayek and Sabel on Reason and
Rules, Organization and Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 357, 364 n.26. Despite rhetorical appeals to
the market, in practice, foundations animated by the new philanthropy are increasingly taking on
dominant roles as central planners, crowding out competition or dissent. As critics of some of
the prominent philanthrocapitalists have noted and as foundation trends suggest, private
foundations are asserting greater control in designing philanthropic solutions. To borrow
Hayek’s analogy, muscular foundations have been acting like the craftsman rather than the
gardener.
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values may lead to subtle but important shifts in emphasis regarding
specific programmatic decisions, which may skew nonprofit grantees
toward projects that adopt market-based approaches, favor individual
over collective action, provide clear measurement, and impact
personnel decisions.
In the marketplace of social change ideas, where only a limited
number of ideas or projects are ultimately funded, a funder’s
preference—whether expressed or not—for certain types of solutions
carries considerable influence. With its emphasis on applying
business and market models, as philanthrocapitalism expands it may
privilege initiatives using market mechanisms to address large-scale
change. Bishop and Green suggest that some prominent
philanthrocapitalists seek to support projects that reflect their “view
that the entrepreneurship of the business world needs to be applied to
social problems and that often . . . this should involve harnessing the
profit motive.”190 The authors also state that this approach has
resonated deeply with a certain class of funders.191 Michael Edwards
argues, however, that such an emphasis is misplaced because “market
values and human values are not just different; they pull in opposite
directions in many important ways.”192
For instance, consider microfinance, a favorite example of a
business-inspired solution to address global poverty favored by
philanthrocapitalists.193 Through the provision of financial services
(microloans, savings accounts, insurance, etc.) in small amounts,
usually without monetary collateral requirements, to low-income
individuals, particularly in the developing world, microfinance has
been used to support entrepreneurial activity so that individuals can
rise from poverty and secure their own economic future.194 It is
incontrovertible that extending access to financial resources and

190 BISHOP

& GREEN, supra note 5, at 117 (emphasis added).
id. (“[P]hilanthropreneurship is a challenge that is attracting not only Omidyar and
Skoll, but also many other entrepreneurial philanthropists.”).
192 EDWARDS, supra note 74, at 66.
193 See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 130 (“Microfinance is the testing ground for
[the] belief that for many nonprofits, and social problems, the best strategy is to harness the
profit motive.”). It is worth noting the irony, however, that microfinance was initially developed
and widely expanded through “bottom-up” philanthropy. See text accompanying notes 174–77.
194 See Anita Bernstein, Pecuniary Reparations Following National Crisis: A Convergence
of Tort Theory, Microfinance, and Gender Equality, 31 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 1, 37 (2009)
(discussing how microfinance supports women and gender equality); Pamela Das, Avoiding a
Subprime-Like Crises in Microfinance: Lessons from the Mexican and Bolivian Experience, 15
L. & BUS. REV. AM. 819, 823 (2009) (discussing the relationship between microfinance and the
alleviation of poverty); Terry M. Dworkin & Cindy A. Schipani, Linking Gender Equity to
Peaceful Societies, 44 AM. BUS. L.J. 391, 410–14 (2007) (discussing how microfinance supports
women and gender equality).
191 See
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services to the poor is a beneficial undertaking,195 but microfinance
may be especially attractive to philanthrocapitalists because it draws
on market norms and seeks to replicate familiar private sector
structures. Notice that microfinance as a solution to global poverty is
focused on reimagining poor individuals primarily as sellers and
buyers of goods, is based on competition with actors vying with one
another for a scarce resource (in this case, profit), privileges wealth
creation over distribution, and is grounded in the idea of individual
self-help as the driver of change.
Although microloans may assist individual borrowers, there is no
evidence that microfinance as an institution has led to systematic
change transforming poor countries into rich ones or impoverished
communities into wealthy ones. Edwards argues that microfinance
will not eradicate poverty on its own.196 In his view, sustainable,
widespread poverty reduction requires larger shifts in social and
political dynamics, such as creating many well-paying jobs through
agro-industrialization, addressing land rights, and providing largescale access to health care, education, and public works.197 What is
worrisome is that using microfinance as a paradigmatic example of
the kind of preferred social change intervention encourages a bias
toward business-like initiatives that favor competition, efficiency, and
individualism.198 If enough funders believe that to “save the world”
means adopting these particular principles, our giving may change in
ways that lose sight of inclusiveness and equity, expression,
institutional reform, and broad-based participation as means of
effective social transformation.
In fact, some philanthrocapitalists have advocated refashioning
microfinance to more aggressively pursue profit as a dominant
purpose in order to expand their capacity to serve more people.199
Although surely well intentioned, this thinking demonstrates the
195 Economist Muhammad Yunus and his Grameen Bank of Bangladesh received the
Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 for pioneering microfinance. See Press Release, Norwegian Nobel
Comm., The Nobel Peace Prize for 2006 (Oct. 13, 2006), available at http://nobelprize.org
/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/press.html (“Micro-credit has proved to be an important
liberating force in societies where women in particular have to struggle against repressive social
and economic conditions.”). For more the origins of Grameen and microfinance, see
MUHAMMAD YUNUS, BANKER TO THE POOR: MICRO-LENDING AND THE BATTLE AGAINST
WORLD POVERTY (2003).
196 EDWARDS, supra note 74, at 40.
197 Id.
198 See id. at 68 (“Philanthrocapitalism assumes that competition will make civil society
more efficient and thereby bring more social change, but this is a particularly damaging form of
social Darwinism that misreads the way social change actually occurs.”).
199 See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 116–17 (describing an argument made to a
group of philanthropists that relying on a nonprofit model rather than a for-profit model for the
expansion of microfinance was “a big mistake” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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extent to which the border between the nonprofit and for-profit
sectors has become so porous that a new vision of “smart
philanthropy” can encompass treating the poor simultaneously as
charitable beneficiaries and as profit-generating targets ripe for
market exchanges with the funder.200
As commentators have long noted, charity, particularly when
targeted at the less advantaged, sometimes does more than just
provide aid and material support to those in need. It may also seek to
express the values of the donor201 and/or to instill particular values in
the individual beneficiaries of charity, such as democracy,202
religion,203 cleanliness,204 and morality,205 among others. Here we see
the promotion of market-based principles that have the effect of
turning people into individual self-maximizers, rational calculators of
costs and benefits. Law and development scholars, such as Amy
Cohen, among others, argue that development initiatives, such as
microfinance, advance efforts to produce new, and potentially
neoliberal, forms of personhood.206 In a recent article, Cohen observes
how development programs aspire to “processes of selftransformation that produce both marked and manageable change.

200 See Connie Bruck, Millions for Millions: This Year’s Nobel Peace Prize Winner and
Some High-Tech Entrepreneurs Are Competing to Provide Credit to the World’s Poor, NEW
YORKER, Oct. 30, 2006, at 62 (recounting Yunus’s reaction to the suggestion that a for-profit
model would be preferable: “Let them [for-profit entities] make money—but why do you want
to make money off the poor people? You make money somewhere else. Here, you come to help
them. When they have enough flesh and blood in their bodies, go and suck them, no problem.
But, until then, don’t do that.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
201 See PETER FRUMKIN, ON BEING NONPROFIT: A CONCEPTUAL AND POLICY PRIMER
104–07 (2002) (discussing the role of values in the nonprofit sector); ROBERT L. PAYTON &
MICHAEL P. MOODY, UNDERSTANDING PHILANTHROPY: ITS MEANING AND MISSION 35 (2008)
(noting that philanthropy conveys collective values).
202 See Jenkins, supra note 150, at 832 (arguing that public charities conducting work
abroad convey democratic ideals to local communities).
203 See FRUMKIN, supra note 201, at 106–07 (discussing the desire of donors to promote
faith through charity); cf. Martha Minow, Public and Private Partnerships: Accounting for the
New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1239 (2003) (discussing the religious motives and
influences connected to certain social welfare activities).
204 See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Locating Latinos in the Field of Civil Rights: Assessing the
Neoliberal Case for Radical Exclusion, 83 TEX. L. REV. 489, 507–08 (2004) (book review)
(noting that early settlement houses served as “‘Americanization’ agents, self-appointed and
otherwise, who taught . . . American standards of cleanliness . . . and social behavior”).
205 See, e.g., PAYTON & MOODY, supra note 201, at 111–14 (discussing philanthropy as a
form of “moral action” and an intervention into peoples lives “that can sometimes offend or
disturb”); see also Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 650 (2000) (discussing a
nonprofit’s effort to impart “moral straightness”).
206 See Amy J. Cohen, Thinking with Culture in Law and Development, 57 BUFF. L. REV.
511, 570 (2009) (noting that Professor Katharine Rankin refers to these as efforts to generate
“rational economic woman”).
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That is, these programs would produce people who come to hold
different values and self-understandings . . . .”207
These insights raise important questions about how a preference
for increased market-based philanthropy might not only reshape
grantee organizations but also the people served by them. The
ideology of market-based social change initiatives usually seeks to
create individual winners within an existing economic system.
Alternative views of philanthropy that promote social transformation
based on, for example, instilling more communitarian or egalitarian
values,208 may lead to different types of solutions and the promotion
of different values. Another problem is that market-led interventions
will likely create only small shifts in an unequal world. Without
broader political, social, and cultural shifts, increased individual
participation in markets is likely to reproduce existing inequalities
rather than unsettle traditional hierarchies. 209
This is not to say that economic and market-led charitable activity
is without merit. Quite the contrary, market-based solutions to public
problems may work in some settings, but they are hardly a panacea.
Social transformation also requires collective action, relationship
building, participation, and political change. In Edwards’s view,
[T]he world needs more civil society influence on business,
not the other way around—more cooperation not competition,
more collective action not individualism, and a greater
willingness to work together to change the fundamental
structures that keep most people poor so that all of us can live
more fulfilling lives.210
In addition, philanthrocapitalism may lead to an increase in profitmotivated decision making by charitable organizations,211 thus,
exacerbating problems related to what is known as mission creep or

207 Id.

at 574 (emphasis omitted).
208 See, e.g., PAYTON & MOODY, supra note 201, at 50; Lisa M. Fairfax, “With Friends
Like These . . .”: Toward a More Efficacious Response to Affinity-Based Securities and
Investment Fraud, 36 GA. L. REV. 63, 95–96 (2001).
209 See EDWARDS, supra note 74, at 43 (quoting nonprofit activists who stated that
“[p]hilanthrocapitalists may wish to see more wealth trickle down to the poor, but NGOs—if the
truly wish to minister to the needs of the poor—must strive to change the shape of the pyramid
itself” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
210 Edwards, supra note 42, at 27.
211 See Norman I. Silber, Anticonsultative Trends in Nonprofit Governance, 86 OR. L. REV.
65, 74 (2007) (describing corporate influence leading to a “new nonprofit culture of financial
effectiveness and accountability,” as well as a new corporate-oriented vocabulary of
organizational services “routinely called ‘the product,’ and its reputation referred to as ‘the
franchise’”).
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mission drift.212 While nonprofits, of course, need to be mindful of
responsible fiscal management and stewardship, their constant search
for additional resources can obfuscate key priorities, causing them to
emphasize more profitable activities at the expense of other more
traditional, but perhaps less lucrative, activities.
Challenges faced by university presses illustrate this trend. For
decades the university press was considered a core aspect of the
intellectual mission and contribution of great research universities,
but in recent years, university boards and presidents have redefined
their academic mission to exclude publishing quality scholarship.213
In fact, often viewed as “too costly” or an “economic drain[],”
university presses have been severely cut back214 or shuttered
altogether.215 Of course, research universities, like all nonprofits,
often need to make difficult financial decisions. However, what is
interesting about this recent shift regarding higher education’s view of
the worthiness of knowledge—a social good that private markets do
not necessarily sustain216—is how the publication of research is so
easily analogized to a business, with its survival based on commercial
profitability, rather than excellence or scholarly contributions.217 The
212 See id. at 89 (discussing issues related to mission creep). Mission creep refers to an
organizational phenomenon in which entities inadvertently, over time, stray from their
fundamental mission by engaging in activities or behaviors less closely related to the core
charitable purpose.
213 See, e.g., Willis G. Regier, Profit or Perish: Today’s University Presses, 1 AM. ACAD.
111 (2004) (exploring how university presses have responded to the pressure to publish
profitable books); John B. Thompson, Editorial, Survival Strategies for Academic Publishing,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. June 17, 2005, at B6 (discussing growing pressures for university
presses to become “self-supporting” and institutional uncertainty over their status as “academic
units or business units”).
214 See Peter Applebome, Profit Squeeze for Publishers Makes Tenure More Elusive, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 18, 1996, at A1 (reporting that university presses are “cutting back” on
publications and focusing more on issues of marketability in its decisions, which is a threat to
“works of academic importance but narrow appeal”); see also Richard S. Markovits, Legal
Scholarship: The Course, 48 J. LEGAL EDUC. 539, 546 (1998) (“[U]niversity presses are
increasingly interested in the financial bottom line and are reluctant to publish any book,
regardless of its merit, on which they may not break even.”); David Spielberg, The Case for
Books: Past, Present, and Future, 9 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1, 3 (2009–10) (book review), available at
http://law.suffolk.edu/highlights/stuorgs/jhtl/book_reviews/2009_2010/David%20Spielberg%20
Book%20Review.pdf (“[U]niversity presses unwillingness to publish for lack of a market and
distribution”).
215 See Jennifer Howard, When a University Press Falls, Who Catches Its Authors?,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 26, 2010, at A13 (discussing the closure of Eastern Washington
University Press); Peter Monaghan, Financial Squeeze on University Presses Is Likely to
Persist, Insiders Agree, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., July 9, 2004, at A20 (noting the closure of both
the Northeastern University Press and the University of Idaho Press); Michael E. Young &
Steven R. Thompson, SMU Press Suspending Its Operations, DALL. MORNING NEWS, May 6,
2010, at 7B (reporting on the suspension of operations of SMU Press).
216 See MINOW, supra note 12, at 44.
217 See Lawrence B. Solum, Blogging and the Transformation of Legal Scholarship, 84
WASH. U. L. REV. 1071, 1080 (2006) (“[M]ost university presses must now ‘float on their own
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subsequent move then has been for some academic leaders to dismiss
the dissemination of research as falling outside the academic core.218
This example demonstrates how the introduction of business values
can have subtle effects on the work of institutions in potentially
undesirable ways.219
To be clear, philanthrocapitalism is not the sole cause of nonprofit
mission drift, nor is it responsible for nonprofit entities engaging in
cost-benefit calculations.220 Indeed, I fully recognize that nonprofits
have always balanced ideals with financial realities. For example,
certain nonprofits, particularly universities, have long charged fees,
which serve to limit access to their services. The real concern,
however, is that the principles of philanthrocapitalism may push taxexempt organizations to substitute mission-related goals with a profit
motive. In this respect, philanthrocapitalism advances the longobserved trend toward commercialization in the nonprofit sector.
When profit seeking becomes a foundation-approved guiding
principle, then it becomes much easier for the profit motive to guide
decision making instead of social utility.
Moreover, philanthrocapitalism, with its emphasis on measuring
success in terms of quantifiable outcomes, may limit the space for
participatory, bottom-up problem solving, which is intrinsically
valuable.221 If we consider, for example, the earlier hypothetical
foundation working on elementary- and secondary-school reform
through support of charter schools discussed in section III.A.1,222 we
recall that the school’s emphasis on metrics at the behest of the
foundation is an attempt to create accountability. But it may instead

bottom.’ That is, they are expected to turn a profit or at least break even.”).
218 See, e.g., Jennifer Howard, Louisiana State U. Press Fights to Preserve Its Essential
Value, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., May 28, 2009, http://chronicle.com/article/Louisiana-State-UPress-Fi/44417 (quoting a university chancellor who stated that the university press was
perceived as “a valuable asset,” but not within the “academic core” of its parent institution
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
219 See generally Kate O’Neill, Against Dicta: A Legal Method for Rescuing Fair Use from
the Right of First Publication, 89 CAL. L. REV. 369, 402 n.118 (2001) (explaining that
university presses are likely to be among the most restrictive publishers regarding authorizing
free and low-cost uses of copyrighted material, because of financial pressures they face). Such a
willingness to protect commercial interests seems to conflict with the ideal of university
scholars freely engaged in an exchange of ideas and research to disseminate knowledge.
220 See TO PROFIT OR NOT TO PROFIT (Burton Weisbrod ed., 1998); David A. Brennen, A
Diversity Theory of Charitable Tax Exemption—Beyond Efficiency, Through Critical Race
Theory, Toward Diversity, 4 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 35–36 (2006); John D. Colombo, Commercial
Activity and Charitable Tax Exemption, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 487, 489–90 (2002); Garry
W. Jenkins, Incorporation Choice, Uniformity, and the Reform of Nonprofit State Law, 41 GA.
L. REV. 1113, 1167–69 (2007) ; Kelley, supra note 22, at 2463–64.
221 See supra text accompanying notes 159–61.
222 See supra text accompanying note 138.
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create an accountability shift. Rather than being accountable to
parents, the community, teachers, and students, schools that are
obsessively focused on test results can be said to become
“accountable” to an unregulated testing industry. A recent study on
the impact of performance measurement on grantor-grantee
relationships determined that “a funder’s focus on short-term
quantifiable results can stifle grantee learning and steer attention
away from the concerns of other important stakeholders, particularly
beneficiaries.”223
The desire to incorporate a business perspective into philanthropy
also may influence organizational governance. A wide range of
nonprofit boards of directors, who are largely made up of elites and
individuals with corporate backgrounds, are increasingly selecting
individuals with significant private-sector experience when they make
important personnel decisions. In 2011, two of the three largest U.S.
private foundations were headed by chief executive officers drawn
from the corporate sector without prior extensive professional work
experience with either government or nonprofits.224 My research
indicates that this is the first time in at least half a century that
executives who spent the bulk of their careers in the for-profit sector
have so dominated the top echelons of philanthropic foundation
posts.225 Of course, these anecdotal observations are too small in
number to draw definitive conclusions, but they help illustrate the
sector’s increasing interest, not just in transferring corporate
management skills to the nonprofit sector, but also in bringing in
corporate management experience through their hiring, a trend which
may be connected to the rhetoric and principles associated with
philanthrocapitalism. It may be too soon to determine what results
will be achieved by business-managers-turned-foundation-CEOs. If it

223 Lehn M. Benjamin, Funders as Principals: Performance Measurement in Philanthropic
Relationships, 20 NONPROFIT MGMT. & LEADERSHIP 383, 386 (2010).
224 The Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation is headed by Jeffrey S. Raikes, who prior to
being named chief executive officer in 2008, served as a software product executive for twentyseven years. See Ben Gose, Longtime Microsoft Executive Is Chosen to Lead Gates Foundation,
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, May 29, 2008, at 40. The Ford Foundation is headed by Luis Ubinas,
who prior to assuming the presidency in 2008, advised Fortune 100 media, telecommunications
and technology companies at McKinsey & Company for eighteen years. See Stephanie Strom,
Ford Foundation Selects Its New Leader from Outside the Philanthropic World, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 14, 2007, at A11.
225 I examined the professional backgrounds of the presidents of the three largest U.S.
private foundations in the early part of each of the past four decades: 2010, 2000, 1991, 1981,
and 1972. The three largest private foundations were identified by the Foundation Center
through publication in the Foundation Directory (2000, 1991, and 1981 editions) or listed on the
Foundation Center website (2010). For the 1972 data I relied on the list provided in Waldemar
Nielsen’s classic book on private foundations from that year. See NIELSEN, supra note 41, at 22.
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turns out like other experiments with business leaders transitioning to
public office, however, then the results will likely be mixed.226
More than just a buzzword, philanthrocapitalism presupposes
certain values that may not be fully understood, especially to the
extent the term becomes conflated with “strategic” or “effective”
grantmaking. Accepting its tenets without critical examination may
turn the practice of philanthropy in new directions and generate
unintended side effects for charitable organizations.
C. Changing Individual and Government Giving
As discussed previously, philanthrocapitalism focuses on the
power of business elites actively using their corporate skills and
vocabulary to engage in “high performance” philanthropy. 227 The
rhetoric of philanthrocapitalism centers on the activity of the
superwealthy. This emphasis carries a risk that the goal of increased
giving by some could supplant the also-important goal of increasing
giving by a wider cross section of ordinary individuals or
governments. Fueled by the prospects of big results, the rhetoric of
the philanthrocapitalism movement positions “effective giving” as
something that ordinary individual donors who lack serious wealth
cannot mimic in size, scope, or style. Thus, the more typical
individual donors may feel left out of this new vision of effectiveness
and possibly become disinclined to give or to donate less than they
otherwise might.228
One core message of philanthrocapitalism is that smart
philanthropy is too difficult for those who have not been vetted by the
rough-and-tumble world of the stock exchange. However, once
“smart” or “strategic” philanthropy is seen as requiring an M.B.A.
degree, proven business acumen, donations large enough to allow the
donor to call the shots, and direct access to world leaders, it calls into
226 Cf. Andrew Romano & Michael Hirsh, America, Inc., NEWSWEEK, Feb. 22, 2010, at 36
(stating that Jon Corzine, a former Fortune 50 CEO who served as a U.S. senator and a
governor, no longer believes that being a corporate chieftain prepares one for the public
leadership after having had the experience of holding elected office); Erik Sherman, Meg
Whitman and Carly Fiorina: Why Ex-Tech CEOs Make Dangerous Politicians, BNET (June 8,
2010), http://www.bnet.com/blog/technology-business/meg-whitman-and-carly-fiorina-why-extech-ceos-make-dangerous-politicians/4025 (“[T]he skills of a good public leader are usually
quite different from those of a CEO.”).
227 See Matthew Bishop, A Tarnished Capitalism Still Serves Philanthropy, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 11, 2008, at F25 (noting philanthrocapitalists oft-stated desire to make “high performance”
donations).
228 Of course, some ordinary individual donors have relied on institutional expertise when
it comes to charitable contributions by making gifts through intermediary organizations, such as
the United Way, which raises money and disburses general operating support grants to local
public charities. But the philanthrocapitalism rhetoric goes further.
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question the value of the philanthropy conducted by the average
donor. Despite the image projected by philanthrocapitalism, most
charitable giving in 2009 was not from billionaire-funded private
foundations or large corporate enterprises. Instead, the largest portion
of total private giving to nonprofit organizations in 2009—eightythree percent—was contributed by individuals through direct giving
and charitable bequests.229 In contrast, foundations and corporations
combined gave seventeen percent.230 These figures illustrate the
importance of individual giving in philanthropy.231 With so much
support coming from individuals, the nonprofit sector has a stake in
assuring that the culture of giving remains inclusive. In a recent book
explaining one reason why people do not donate more to important
charitable causes, Princeton University ethicist Peter Singer points to
a sense of futility and a diffusion of responsibility that contributes to a
belief that others will take care of a problem.232 The rhetoric of
philanthrocapitalism compounds this phenomenon. This is
particularly problematic for Singer and others who argue for a
significant increase in giving by ordinary individuals targeted at
global development and relief efforts as the best means to end
extreme global poverty.233 The professionalization of the nonprofit
sector should not dampen the desire of those who are not extremely
wealthy from engaging in meaningful philanthropy.
Messages about effectiveness that may discourage individual
giving are undesirable not simply because of the potential lost
revenue to the charitable sector, but because charitable giving
provides an important means of expression and associational
affiliation that binds civil society. Nonprofit engagement serves a
critical role by providing civic glue that holds the social fabric
together, contributing to social capital, and strengthening public
life.234 Personal giving by individuals reflects human compassion,
229 See GIVING USA FOUND. & THE CTR. ON P HILANTHROPY AT I ND. UNIV., GIVING USA
2010: THE ANNUAL REPORT ON PHILANTHROPY FOR THE YEAR 2009, at 10–11 (2010) (noting
that of the $303 billion donated, $251.2 billion was from individuals and $52.5 billion from
foundations and corporations).
230 See id.
231 It is worth noting, however, that the statistics mentioned above aggregate giving for a
variety of different purposes (e.g., education, religious, arts, health, environmental, etc.), and
that depending on the specific purpose, the proportional influence of institutional donors relative
to individual donors may vary.
232 PETER SINGER, THE LIFE YOU CAN SAVE: ACTING NOW TO END WORLD POVERTY 52–
54 (2009).
233 See, e.g., id. at 151–73 (proposing that individuals should give five percent, but in some
cases more, of their income to help people living in extreme poverty around the world).
234 See ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF
AMERICAN COMMUNITY 336–49 (2000); Elizabeth T. Boris, Nonprofit Organizations in a
Democracy—Roles and Responsibilities, in NONPROFITS & GOVERNMENT: COLLABORATION &
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deepens ties between individuals and organizations, connects people
to other citizens, permits a means for one to lend direct support for
concrete action, facilitates civic and political engagement, and instills
democratic values. Accordingly, it is the work of all citizens, not just
the province of the superrich. Broad-based individual giving
engenders a sense of mutual dependence and shared values that build
connections among the people in a democracy.235
In addition to impacting ordinary individuals, we must also
consider the effect of philanthrocapitalism and its rhetoric on the role
of governments in social problem solving. Because the movement
emphasizes wealthy private citizens as those most able to “save the
world,” the state is distanced from solutions and positioned as an
unnecessary bureaucratic link. In many respects, philanthrocapitalism
is linked to three decades of neoliberal policies that have sought to
privatize social welfare.236 It teaches people that corporations and
compassionate and powerful individuals will care for societal
problems, presumably obviating the need for government regulation,
liberal welfare policies, progressive taxation, and the like. As a result,
the lure of philanthrocapitalism may further limit our imagination or
political will to engage in collective, broad-based, bottom-up social
transformation.
As the philanthrocapitalism model has spread, by positioning itself
as the model for effective grantmaking, it has also influenced
government-funding processes. Both local and federal governments
are beginning to mirror the muscular practices of the new
philanthropists. For example, in New York City, a senior policy
official writes that the city government has “taken dramatic steps to
. . . demand measurable results from [supported nonprofits].”237 The
language of the statement acknowledges that the state’s interactions
with grantee nonprofits have changed in significant ways and conveys
a mindset about the relationship: that the state makes demands and

CONFLICT 1, 2 (Elizabeth T. Boris & C. Eugene Steuerle eds., 2d ed. 2006); Jenkins, supra note
150, at 788–89.
235 See CLAIRE GAUDIANI, THE GREATER GOOD: HOW PHILANTHROPY DRIVES THE
AMERICAN ECONOMY AND CAN SAVE CAPITALISM 2 (2003); see also Alice M. Thomas, ReEnvisioning the Charitable Deduction to Legislate Compassion and Civility: Reclaiming Our
Collective and Individual Humanity Through Sustained Volunteerism, 19 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 269, 302 (2010).
236 See Eduardo R.C. Capulong, Which Side Are You On? Unionization in Social Service
Nonprofits, 9 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 373, 376 (2006); Dorothy E. Roberts, Privatization and
Punishment in the New Age of Reprogenetics, 54 EMORY L.J. 1343, 1348 (2005).
237 Jeanne B. Mullgrav, Government Gets in the Game: Strategic Philanthropy Isn’t Just
for Foundations Anymore, 9 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 295, 295 (2006) (emphasis added) (writing as
Commissioner of the New York City Department of Youth and Community Development).
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expects the nonprofits to follow. Moreover, the city government has
explicitly “adopted the strategic philanthropy model of investment
familiar to the corporate and foundation worlds.”238
At the federal level, a newly created Social Innovation Fund Pilot
Program (SIF) serves as an example of strategic philanthropy
principles being incorporated into government-funding processes
from Washington, D.C. Created by the Edward M. Kennedy Serve
America Act of 2009 and administered by the Corporation for
National and Community Service (CNCS),239 the SIF supports
nonprofit organizations working in underserved neighborhoods and
communities on various issue areas.240 For five years, beginning in
2010 with a $50 million allocation and through 2014 when the
allocation grows to $100 million,241 the SIF is authorized to make
grants ranging from $1 million to $10 million each to intermediary
organizations.242 The intermediary grantees will then make subgrants
to nonprofit organizations, in amounts not less than $100,000.243 The
program requires matching funds of two nonfederal dollars for every
SIF dollar given: one dollar matched by the intermediary and one
raised by the local recipient grantee of the intermediary.244
In many respects, several of the statutory requirements and plans
to administer the SIF seem to be taken right out of the
philanthrocapitalism playbook: leveraging other funders (through the
matching grants ultimately turning the federal government’s $50
million into $200 million), emphasizing data measurement and
results-oriented outcomes, using business/philanthrocapitalism jargon
(e.g., “investments,” “leveraging capital,” “measurable outcomes,”
“social entrepreneurs”), favoring replication and expansion of
established programs, and preferring “hands on” engagement by the
intermediary.245 Even prior to its completion of the review of grant
applications, CNCS publicly announced its intention to concentrate
the SIF funding on larger grants at the high end of its discretion in the
$5 to $10 million range, thus favoring a smaller number of grantees
receiving larger dollar amounts;246 the program chose to divide the
238 Id.
239 42

U.S.C. § 12501 (Supp. III 2010).
§ 12653k(b), (f)(3).
241 Id. § 12681(a)(4)(E).
242 Id. § 12653k(e).
243 Id. § 12653k(j)(2).
244 Id. § 12653k(i), (k).
245 See Stephen Goldsmith, Introducing the Social Innovation Fund, THE WHITE HOUSE
BLOG (Feb. 17, 2010, 3:00 PM), http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/02/17/introducingsocial-innovation-fund (describing the goals and strategies of the Social Innovation Fund).
246 See Suzanne Perry, Federal Agency Spells Out Criteria for Spending Innovation Fund,
CHRON. PHILANTHROPY, Jan. 14, 2010, at 16 (discussing the Corporation for National and
240 Id.
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inaugural funding among just eleven recipients.247 Taken together,
these examples suggest that the reach of philanthrocapitalism
principles has affected grantmaking practices far beyond the activities
of just a few very large foundations, and that government is now an
active participant in the new philanthropy as well.
Finally, there is concern that philanthrocapitalism and other forms
of muscular philanthropy may divert attention from and participation
in community-based philanthropy. The danger is that “the rich will
save us” arguments may generate an apathy that undermines
grassroots philanthropy, which seeks to involve communities in
solving their own problems. Without the full engagement of
communities and multiple parties in society working together to forge
new social arrangements, our solutions are more likely to be tinkering
around the edges rather than systematic reforms, which usually
require greater involvement of and support from multiple
constituencies. To a large extent, the contributions of nonprofits to
civil society are not just valued for their achievement or end results,
but also because nonprofits are organizations by and for the people,
creating binding ties and relationships. In other words, in nonprofit
work, the means are just as important as the ends.248 Peter Singer has
reminded us that we may applaud the generosity of Gates and Buffett,
but still be uneasy with a brand of philanthropy that places the fates of
so many in the hands of so few.249 Both foundations and their
nonprofit partners should not lose sight of the fact that there is no
monopoly on creative public problem solving and experimentation in
the social sector, and that philanthropy can only become dangerously
insular and elitist if it confuses wealth with wisdom.

Community Service’s plans to spend the monies that it received from the Social Innovation
Fund).
247 See Press Release, Corp. for Nat’l & Cmty. Serv., Inaugural Social Innovation Fund
Grants Awarded to Experienced Innovators (July 22, 2010), available at http://www.national
service.gov/about/newsroom/releases_detail.asp?tbl_pr_id=1829 (describing the distribution of
the agency’s initial grants).
248 See PUTNAM, supra note 234, at 336–49 (arguing that participation in voluntary groups
fosters development of important civic skills); Jenkins, supra note 150, at 788–89 (discussing
the connections between philanthropic activity, civic life, social capital, and democratic
governance); see also Miriam Galston, Civic Renewal and the Regulation of Nonprofits, 13
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 289, 291 (2004) (same).
249 Peter Singer, What Should a Billionaire Give—and What Should You?, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 17, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 58.
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D. Undermining Democratic Values
The goals and spirit embedded in a particular philosophy of
philanthropy inevitably will shape its practices and attitudes. It is not
surprising that a philanthropic system based on market principles
would favor solutions grounded in competition and individualism,
whereas one based on communitarian principles would emphasize
solutions grounded in cooperation and collective action. The rhetoric
and philosophy of philanthrocapitalism thus implicate democratic
values and philanthropic values, which in turn may impact the types
of projects more likely to receive funding.
Over the past decade, academics have focused their attention on
the pervasive pattern of outsourcing and privatization by which core
government functions are being transferred to private contractors.250
Prominent law professors, including Laura Dickinson, Jody Freeman,
and Martha Minow, have raised important questions about the
commitment to democratic values, accountability, and public
participation associated with this emergent form of governance
through private contract.251 Out of their work has come a push to
ensure that those important public values do not become divorced
from vital functions. They stress that in cases when outsourcing may
be appropriate, essential democratic norms should travel with the
work, regardless of the service provider. Scholars are increasingly
recognizing the hybridization of public and private functions in the
government and for-profit contexts.252 Similarly, in the philanthropic
setting, I argue that as private foundations take on public issues in
their role as active participants in civil society governance, the way in
which they conduct their activities holds the potential either to
250 See Edward Rubin, The Possibilities and Limitations of Privatization, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 890, 890–91 (2010) (reviewing GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT: OUTSOURCING AND
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (Jody Freeman & Martha Minow eds., 2009)) (noting that the debate
about privatization dates back to “the 1970s, but [is now] accelerating in response to the second
Bush Administration’s unalloyed enthusiasm for privatization”).
251 See generally GOVERNMENT BY CONTRACT, supra note 250; MINOW, supra note 12;
Laura A. Dickinson, Government For Hire: Privatizing Foreign Affairs and the Problem of
Accountability Under International Law, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 135 (2005); Laura A.
Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World, 31 YALE J. INT’L L. 383 (2006); Jody
Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1285 (2003);
Martha Minow, Outsourcing Power: How Privatizing Military Efforts Challenges
Accountability, Professionalism, and Democracy, 46 B.C. L. REV. 989 (2005); Minow, supra
note 203.
252 See, e.g., Sharon Dolovich, State Punishment and Private Prisons, 55 DUKE L.J. 437
(2005) (examining private prisons); Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1367 (2003) (discussing the delegation of welfare, public education, and other
public functions to private entities); David A. Super, Privatization, Policy Paralysis, and the
Poor, 96 CAL. L. REV. 393 (2008) (discussing the effects of privatization on public benefit
programs).

1/13/2011 11:14:11 PM

2011]

WHO’S AFRAID OF PHILANTHROCAPITALISM?

63

advance or erode fundamental public values. The more ambitious
philanthrocapitalists, in particular, are undertaking projects focused
on addressing global poverty, education, terrorism, environmental
issues,253 and democracy,254 all deeply associated with matters we
might think of as governmental. Accordingly, their work should be
critically examined to ensure that public values also travel with them
as they claim the mantle of superior public issue problem solvers on
behalf of society.
The largest concern is that philanthrocapitalism as a model for
philanthropy may be unhealthy for democracy. Professor Evelyn
Brody has acknowledged the conflicted relationship between private
philanthropy and democratic values.
Democracies feel ambivalent about private philanthropy:
‘We expect rich men to be generous with their wealth and
criticize them when they are not; but when they make
benefaction, we question their motives, deplore the methods
by which they obtained their abundance, and wonder
whether their gifts will not do more harm than good.’255
Brody and the Filer Commission are acknowledging deep-seated
concerns for democracy when rich elites make philanthropic
decisions affecting large segments of the polity. This concern
becomes especially meaningful if we value the work of the nonprofit
sector not simply for what results it achieves (as the
philanthrocapitalists so often do), but for its potential to inculcate
democratic practices of self-government and serve as a mediating
space between markets and government.256 As private foundations
“help[] to meet public needs[,] . . . respond[] to human problems,
shap[e] the moral agenda, and express[] cultural values” through their
work, they assume “a vital role in maintaining (and reforming) . . .

253 See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 3 (describing the range of problems that
philanthrocapitalists seek to address).
254 See id. at 9 (discussing the philanthropy of George Soros).
255 Evelyn Brody, Institutional Dissonance in the Nonprofit Sector, 41 VILL. L. REV. 433,
442 (1996) (quoting COMMISSION ON PRIVATE PHILANTHROPY AND PUBLIC NEEDS REPORT,
better known as the Filer Commission Report, from 1975).
256 See Barbara K. Bucholtz, Reflections on the Role of Nonprofit Associations in a
Representative Democracy, 7 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 555, 556 (1998) (“[T]he nonprofit
sector makes a significant, probably pivotal, contribution to the American form of representative
democracy in at least three respects. First, the nonprofit sector teaches the skills of selfgovernment. Second, it inculcates habits of tolerance and civility. Finally, it mediates the space
between the individual and the other two sectors of society, that is, the ‘public’ or governmental
sector and the ‘private’ or ‘entrepreneurial’ or ‘proprietary’ sector.”); Jenkins, supra note 150, at
832 (noting the contributions of nonprofits to creating social capital and constructing civil
society).
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democra[tic society].”257 This deep connection between philanthropy
and democracy is important because changes in one sphere potentially
influence the other. As philanthropic studies scholars Robert Payton
and Michael Moody argue, “Democracy needs philanthropy because
democracy is not simply a political phenomenon; it is a cultural one
as well. Many of the values that uphold the culture of democracy are
fostered not in government or in the marketplace but in
philanthropy.”258 Through both the content and the process of their
giving, foundations contribute to democratic governance by directing
resources to selected people, ideas, and programs and by facilitating
the practices of self-government with public charity partners. As
grant-seeking charities compete for funding, they develop projects
that engage and ultimately aggregate the individual voices, opinions
and perspectives of various organizational stakeholders (i.e., staff,
board members, volunteers, members, and community members
served by the entity). Thus viewing philanthropy as an ally of
representative democracy makes philanthrocapitalism all the more
worrisome. To the extent that private foundations treat grantees as
subcontractors and dominate public charities, they undercut
opportunities for foundation giving to support civic participation and
broad-based involvement in a dynamic and diverse civil society.
By its very terms, the philanthrocapitalism project advances the
concentration of power and influence in the hands of small numbers
of the wealthiest Americans: an elite set of philanthrocapitalists
relying on their personal views and business experience to select
social solutions for the rest of society. But if they are to “save the
world,” the preferences of philanthrocapitalists must match the needs
and desires of the broader global society. From this perspective, the
idea that the superwealthy should maintain a strong directive hand in
controlling the nonprofit sector’s resources and approaches to
problem solving looks self-serving and suspect. For example, some of
our most pressing social problems—environmental justice, human
rights, healthcare, to name a few—lie in highly contested areas where
people hold differing perspectives on the underlying assumptions,
root causes, and solutions, divisions which often pit business interests
against other social goals. Those whose careers have been steeped in
business and who have deep ties to corporate America are likely to
hold views colored by their experiences and interests. 259 Furthermore,
257 PAYTON &

MOODY, supra note 201, at 156.
at 157.
Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Cultural Cognition and Public Policy, 24 YALE
L. & POL’Y REV. 149 (2006) (describing effect of differing cultural worldviews on perception
and policy priorities).
258 Id.

259 Cf.
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the social, cultural, and economic experiences of the superwealthy
often are not representative of that of the broader citizenry, which
may also influence their view on social problem solving. For example
in 2009, in the midst of a severe U.S. economic downturn, the
average income of the top five percent of all earners increased, while
the remaining ninety-five percent of citizens saw a decrease in
income.260 Relying on muscular philanthropy to address these divisive
problems thus threatens to paper over social conflict and to mistake
the foundation’s perspective for social consensus. A major tenet of
democracy is that a variety of independent and representative parties
should be involved for effective problem solving around
transformative social problems, including poverty, justice, bigotry,
international conflict, education, and ethical transparency. Such
responsibility cannot be turned over to an unelected class of corporate
chieftains (even well-intentioned ones) no matter how grateful we
may be for their generosity.
Moreover, with its emphasis on superrich hyperagents solving
social problems,261 philanthrocapitalism amplifies the voice of those
who already wield substantial influence, access, and power.262 This
reality lies in sharp contrast to the traditional role of nonprofit
organizations, which have often provided a means for voices and
views that might otherwise go unheard to be expressed and become
part of the public conversation.263 Instead, the philanthrocapitalism
movement, with its emphasis on the funder, turns that view on its
head and strengthens the voices of the powerful. Not surprisingly,
philanthrocapitalists seem to fully recognize their power base and
embrace the enhanced status and influence to be garnered from their
muscular philanthropy. An explicit strategy of philanthrocapitalists is
260 See Robert C. Lieberman, Why the Rich Are Getting Richer: American Politics and the
Second Gilded Age, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–Feb. 2011, at 154, 154 (reviewing JACOB S. HACKER &
PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW WASHINGTON MADE THE RICH RICHER—
AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS (2010)) (noting that this statistic was a
continuation of a forty-year trend).
261 See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 255.
262 See id. at 49 (noting that “increasingly entrepreneurs . . . form the power elite. . . . Being
rich tends to bring other assets, such as access to other powerful people, that only increases their
hyperagency.”).
263 See Nina J. Crimm, Toward Facilitating a Voice for Politically Marginalized Minorities
and Enhancing Presidential Public Accountability and Transparency in Foreign Health
Policymaking, 39 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1053, 1063 (2006) (describing nonprofit
organizations as “official voices of politically marginalized minorities”); Patricia Julianelle,
Using What We Know: Supporting the Education of Unaccompanied Homeless Youth, 7
SEATTLE J. FOR SOC. JUST. 477, 522 (2009) (“Private, nonprofit organizations can play an
important role . . . ensuring that the voices and wisdom of youth are part of the conversation.”);
Reiser, supra note 73, at 214 (discussing the potential of nonprofits to aggregate individual
voices).
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to seek the ultimate leverage of philanthropic giving by influencing
government to follow their lead in choosing what social initiatives
(both problems and preferred solutions) are worthy of support.264
Traditionally, prominent private foundations have sought similar
influence by viewing themselves as providers of seed funding or
seeking to demonstrate the success of programs and initiatives that
government will be inspired to expand.265 The philanthrocapitalism
movement, however, has taken these modest notions to new levels.266
Diane Ravitch, a prominent historian of education, writing about
the new guard of philanthropists (which she calls “the Billionaire
Boys Club”), states:
We have never in the history of the United States had
foundations with the wealth of the Gates Foundation and
some of the other billionaire foundations—the Walton Family
Foundation, The Broad Foundation. And these three
foundations—Gates, Broad and Walton—are committed now
to charter schools and to evaluating teachers by test scores.
And that’s now the policy of the U.S. Department of
Education. We have never seen anything like this, where
foundations had the ambition to direct national educational
policy, and in fact are succeeding.267
To mention another recent example: a consortium of four family
foundations controlled by philanthrocapitalists jointly informed the
District of Columbia government that they would withdraw $64.5
million in funding if a named individual ceased to serve as the city’s
schools chancellor.268 Although such employment provisions—often
264 See BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 274; see also id. at 63 (describing Gates as
“trying to leverage the foundation’s money . . . by persuading governments and others to put up
money to buy the drugs that result from [its] research”).
265 See FLEISHMAN, supra note 62, at 5 (describing examples of major public innovations
supported by the civic sector such as the national 911 emergency-response system, the public
broadcasting system, and Pell grants); NIELSEN, supra note 41, at 384 (“The giants of the early
years . . . Rockefeller [Foundation], Carnegie [Corporation]… had sought . . . to lead the
evolution of government policy in new directions.”).
266 See Schmit, supra note 165, at 6A (discussing social critic Raj Patel’s unease with the
fact that the Gates Foundation has so much leverage that its “agenda shapes those not only of
other foundations, but governments and international development organizations” with respect
to issued related to hunger in Africa ).
267 Democracy Now!: No Child Left Behind Has Left US Schools with Legacy of
“Institutionalized Fraud” (independent radio and television broadcast Mar. 5, 2010), available
at http://www.democracynow.org/2010/3/5/protests (emphasis added) (statement of guest Diane
Ravitch, former assistant secretary of education); see also DIANE RAVITCH, THE DEATH AND
LIFE OF THE GREAT AMERICAN SCHOOL SYSTEM: HOW TESTING AND CHOICE ARE
UNDERMINING EDUCATION 195–222 (2010) (describing the role of foundations in educational
philanthropy and the risks that their involvement presents to American education).
268 See Bill Turque, If Rhee Leaves, Donors Could Pull Funds, WASH. POST, Apr. 28,
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referred to as “key-man provisions” in corporate deals, which
condition performance on the continued employment of certain
designated personnel—may be commonplace in certain high-level
business agreements, the use of this tool of the business world by
nonprofit entities dealing with a local government is alien to
democratic values. It is striking that the four foundations, formed by a
hedge-fund manager,269 a former hedge-fund manager,270 a retail
heir,271 and an insurance industry entrepreneur,272 based in locations
far from D.C.,273 have intentionally sought to use the power of their
substantial giving to influence local-government personnel decisions.
According to press reports at the time this provision came to light, the
leading mayoral candidates—the position responsible for appointing
the schools chancellor—held divergent views about whether to retain
the incumbent chancellor. The foundations’ actions could be viewed
as a calculated attempt to either pressure the political candidates into
taking a specific position on an important public-policy matter or as a
veiled attempt to influence the voting public274 likely to benefit from

2010, at A1.
269 See LAURA AND & JOHN ARNOLD FOUNDATIONFOUND., I.R.S. Form 990-PF (2008),
http://www.
guidestar.org/FinDocuments/2008/263/241/2008-263241764-0505c60c-F.pdf
(founded
by
billionaire John Arnold, a former Enron natural gas trader, who formed Centaurus Energy, a
Houston-based hedge fund, and Laura, his wife); see also Kaja Whitehouse, The Kid’s a Natural
– Gas: Ex-Enron Trader Earns $1.5B in ’08, N.Y. POST, Mar. 29, 2009, at 33.
270 See ROBERTSON FOUNDATIONFOUND., http://www.robertsonfoundation.org/index.html
(last visited Feb. 7, 2011) (formed by billionaire Julian H. Robertson, Jr., the founder of Tiger
Management Corp., and Josie, his wife; see also Julian Robertson Receives Hedge Fund
Industry Lifetime Achievement Award, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Mar. 31 2010, available at
2010 WLNR 9351228.
271 See WALTON FAMILY FOUNDATIONFOUND., http://www.waltonfamilyfoundation.org
(last visited Feb. 15, 2011) (formed by Sam Walton, founder of Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. and
Helen, his wife, but controlled by their descendants since their deaths); see also Erik W.
Robelen, Walton Family Puts Stamp on Education Landscape, EDUC. WK., Nov. 5, 2008, at 18
(identifying Sam and Helen Walton as the founders of the Walton Family Foundation and
noting that the Waltons’ descendants now control the foundation).
272 See BROAD FOUNDS., http://www.broadfoundation.org (last visited Feb. 7, 2011)
(formed by billionaire Eli Broad, founder of SunAmerica, a financial services firm that is now a
subsidiary of American International Group, Inc. (AIG), and Edythe, his wife); see also
Steinhauer, surpa note 4849.
273 The Laura and John Arnold Foundation (Houston, Texas), the Robertson Foundation
(New York, New York), the Walton Family Foundation (Bentonville, Arkansas), and the Broad
Foundation (Los Angeles, California).
274 Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code prevents private foundations and public
charities from “participat[ing] in, or interven[ing] in . . . any political campaign on behalf of (or
in opposition to) any candidate for public office.” I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006). Moreover, in
addition to putting the tax-exemption at risk, private foundations and their managers are subject
to certain excise taxes on expenditures to influence public elections. Id. § 4945(a)–(b), (c)(2).
This activity as described in media reports, however, would likely not rise to the level of
constituting political intervention. Although the Internal Revenue Service has contended that a
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the substantial grant dollars directed to their community, a third of
which had been earmarked for teacher pay raises negotiated between
the union and the jurisdiction.275 In this instance, however, the voters
did not re-elect the incumbent mayor who supported the school
system chancellor. As a result, the foundation-supported public
official resigned and the grant dollars are at risk. Regardless of the
outcome or the actual motives of the foundations, we should be
concerned when private individuals use philanthropy to exert pressure
on significant public matters, especially when they use private
foundations, which are separate legal entities organized for public
benefit. Yet many philanthrocapitalists are determining that “one of
the most effective ways to leverage their money . . . is to use it to
shape how political power is exercised.”276 As such, models of
philanthropy and actions like this are extolled as effective and
strategic grantmaking, we are likely to see increases in such troubling
behavior, slowly chipping away at important democratic values.
CONCLUSION
Philanthrocapitalism is purposefully ambitious. In this Article, I
argue that this emerging model has already proved itself powerful; its
potential to spread and become, as its proponents envision, a
“revolution”277 makes it worthy of consideration and debate among
scholars and lawyers. Calls for the increased accountability of private
foundations have created a climate in which philanthrocapitalism has
gained currency. Accountability “law talk,” combined with the rise of
the philanthrocapitalism model, has already begun to affect the ways
in which philanthropy is conducted. Other foundations, even those
without a billionaire benefactor, are adapting the techniques of
philanthrocapitalism in an attempt to mimic the state-of-the-art
practices of the “strategic” givers. Remember philanthrocapitalism

nonprofit organization may be deemed to have intervened without an explicit candidate
endorsement, the prototypical cases in this area involve significantly more direct
communication appeals. For a detailed description of the political campaign ban, see FRANCES
R. HILL & DOUGLAS M. MANCINO, TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS ¶¶ 6.04–.05 (2002
& Supp. 2009); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Politics at the Pulpit: Tax Benefits, Substantial Burdens,
and Institutional Free Exercise, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1137, 1144–1149 (2009) (discussing the
history and enforcement of the prohibition on the political activities of 501(c)(3) organizations);
Donald B. Tobin, Political Campaigning by Churches and Charities: Hazardous for 501(c)(3)s,
Dangerous for Democracy, 95 GEO. L.J. 1313, 1317, 1349–55 (2007) (describing the
restrictions on 501(c)(3) organizations’ political activities).
275 See Turque, supra note 268 (describing the grants to the D.C. school system).
276 BISHOP & GREEN, supra note 5, at 240.
277 See id. at 259.
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aims to reach beyond the small world of wealthy grantmaking
foundations—ultimately it seeks to change wide swaths of nonprofit
institutions (both foundations and grant-receiving public charities)
and even to influence government spending and decision making.
The goal of this Article is to interject a note of caution and balance
the overly optimistic views of philanthrocapitalism that have
accompanied its rise. Like supporters of philanthrocapitalism, I hope
that the superwealthy will continue to donate to nonprofit
organizations or form private foundations. I want them, however, to
do so in ways that promote strong civil society, strengthen nonprofit
institutions, and respect and listen to the voices of communities in
need. Results and impact are important, but so are values such as
participation, empowerment, democracy, relationship building, and
community building. In the end, I doubt that analogizing charitable
work to that of capitalist entrepreneurs and Wall Street investors will
enrich the way nonprofits are governed and the way they carry out
their activities—particularly to the extent that nonprofit work
disproportionately affects non-elites in society, i.e., poor,
disadvantaged, and middle-class people. Instead, the growth of
philanthrocapitalism threatens to erode the fragile but significant
partnership that has evolved between public charities and private
foundations, a partnership that respects the expertise and
contributions of both entities. Muscular philanthropy reduces notions
of effective grantmaking to grand-knowing and taskmastering. Such
a perspective reveals a basic misperception about the way nonprofits
succeed in addressing social challenges.
We should not permit our excitement about new financial
resources to blind ourselves to the strings that may be attached to the
new money, strings that may diminish the creative work of public
charities, undermine important philanthropic values, and discourage
individual donors and governments from giving. This is not a debate
that lawyers and other advocates for the nonprofit sector can afford to
sit out or ignore.

